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ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY CONTINGENCY 





This research project examines the problem caused by an inefficient matriculation 
process for contingency contracting officers that is more ad hoc than it is deliberate. The 
report specifically analyzes the fundamental differences among educational resources that 
are available to the contemporary contingency contracting officer: the Defense 
Acquisition University’s CON 234 and CON 334, the Naval Postgraduate School’s MN 
3318, and the U.S. Army’s Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (51C). We examined 
three factors that influence how these courses prepare acquisition professionals: the 
relative similarities and differences among the four courses; the extent to which each 
course benefits contingency contracting officers of varying targeted levels of proficiency; 
and whether the intent of each course is met in relation to its course description and 
targeted audience. The analysis incorporated the use of a benchmark hierarchical model, 
the Yoder Three-tier Model, to differentiate the four courses’ learning objectives and 
target audiences.  Additionally, we assisted the Army’s Expeditionary Contracting 
Command in the fielding and validation of a Proficiency Assessment Test for 
contingency contracting officers.  Our research efforts in this regard included conducting 
market research of Web-based test solutions, designing the user interface, inputting over 
1,400 test questions, and analyzing examinee results. 
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The aggressive outsourcing of support services during the last 15 years has 
created an increasingly complex environment for the contemporary contingency 
contracting officer. As of March 2009, contingency contracting officers deployed in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have administered more than $80 billion in service contracts despite 
being undermanned and inadequately trained, and despite the lack of vital managerial 
resources due to insufficient planning by senior leaders (Thibault et al., 2009). 
Contingency contracting officers and the Department of Defense’s entire workforce of 
acquisition professionals now face tremendous challenges as the Pentagon attempts to re-
balance its fiscal priorities in response to America’s current economic turmoil while 
sustaining a military at war and while continuing to prepare for future security threats. A 
broad cost-cutting initiative—first announced in May 2010 by Secretary of Defense 
Robert M. Gates (Gates, 2010a)—is now driving the defense department to gain 
efficiencies, reduce overhead, and improve effectiveness by reforming the way the 
military does business. While the initiative may prompt the military to sever some 
contractors from its force structure, the warfighters’ inexorable reliance on contracted 
support services underlies the requirement for a sustainable corps of well-educated and 
capable contingency contracting officers. 
In August 2010, Secretary Gates released the final phase of the Efficiencies 
Initiative and remarked that, “The Department of Defense cannot expect America’s 
elected representatives to approve budget increases each year unless we are doing a good 
job, indeed everything possible, to make every dollar count” (Gates, 2010b, para. 5). The 
plan’s overarching purpose is not intended to decrease the department’s top line budget, 
but rather to reduce overhead costs by $100 billion over five years, beginning with the 
fiscal 2012 defense budget, and apply those savings to force structure and modernization. 
At a June 2010 news conference, Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, said: 
 
 2
The defense budget is more than $700 billion, but the focus of the 
initiative is on the $400 billion that is contracted out for goods and 
services. … The objective is to deliver the warfighting capabilities needed 
for the money available by getting better buying power for warfighters and 
taxpayers—in effect, doing more without more. … [Everyone] knows that 
we’re entering a new era, that we’re at an inflection point, and that…we 
need to adapt our management practices to that reality. … We’re [still] 
going to enjoy some real growth in defense spending, but not the kind that 
we’ve enjoyed over the last decade. (Carter, 2010, para. 4–6, 11)  
This research report examines the fundamental educational resources available to 
the contemporary contingency contracting officer. The U.S. military has grown 
considerably reliant on contracted services to support warfighters operating in 
contingency environments, yet it is only just beginning to develop a robust corps of well-
educated and capable contingency contracting officers. In response to legislative 
mandates for acquisition and contracting reform, the military’s contingency contracting 
education system has recently undergone an important modification. We comparatively 
analyzed four contingency contracting educational resources1: the Defense Acquisition 
University’s CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting and CON 334 Advanced 
Contingency Contracting; the Naval Postgraduate School’s MN 3318 Principles of 
Contingency Contracting; and the U.S. Army’s Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks 
(51C) for contingency contracting officers. We examined three factors: the relative 
similarities and differences among the four courses; the extent to which each course 
benefits contingency contracting officers of varying targeted levels of proficiency; and 
whether the intent of each course is met in relation to its course description and targeted 
audience. The analysis incorporated the use of a benchmark hierarchical model, the 
Yoder Three-tier Model. We categorized curricular learning objectives across the Yoder 
Three-tier Model’s hierarchy and, by applying a quantitative rating scheme to the model, 
differentiated the four courses. 
Contingency contracting—the act of directing contracted support to tactical and 
operational forces engaged in contingency operations—has been traditionally disregarded 
                                                 
1 The report hereafter uses the terms course and courses when referring to CON 234, CON 334, MN 
3318 and the SMCT (51C). 
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as a discrete proficiency within the Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition 
workforce. Until recently, contingency contracting was often done on an ad hoc basis and 
was inadequately incorporated into the doctrine and culture of the U.S. military. Even the 
DoD’s sweeping acquisition reforms of the previous 50 years have largely failed to 
acknowledge the effect of contingency contracting on mission outcome, despite 
America’s long history of contingency contracting operations. As such, the absence of 
clear contingency contracting doctrine and policies inhibited the creation of effective 
contingency contracting procedures. Therefore, the acquisition workforce management 
was compelled to improvise a benchmark training course in order to standardize 
knowledge across its contingency contracting officer (CCO) corps. 
By 1997, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) offered the first DoD-wide 
contingency contracting course—CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting—in response 
to a growing demand for further education by acquisition specialists who were, at the 
time, engaged in contracting actions for military exercises, humanitarian operations, and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping mission in the Balkans 
(USD [AT&L], 2008). The CON 234 course emanated from lessons learned by these 
contemporary contingency contracting operations because there was little specific content 
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or in the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to otherwise guide the development of the course. The 
course was significantly updated and redeployed in late 2007 in response to 
congressionally mandated studies on the U.S. Army’s failing contingency contracting 
practices in Iraq. CON 234 is presently offered to qualified acquisition professionals as a 
nine-day resident course at DAU training facilities approximately 20 times per year. 
Other contingency contracting courses have also been developed in recent years, 
although not all are accessible or applicable to all functional levels of CCOs across the 
DoD. In 2003, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA introduced MN 
3318 Principles of Contingency Contracting. MN 3318, certified in 2004 by the DAU as 




resident format to NPS students—typically those enrolled in the school’s acquisition and 
contract management curricula—twice per year, and via distance learning to other 
acquisition professionals at least once per year. 
In September 2009, the U.S. Army released a draft version of the Soldier’s 
Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT) for its 51C2 contracting officers (ECC, 2009). This 
manual was released in an effort to standardize skill sets required for contingency 
contracting officers. This resource is an independent study tool, but its content is 
typically reinforced at the unit level through a mentor program. The SMCT (51C)3, 
developed under the guidance of the Army Contracting Command (ACC), includes 36 
key tasks comprising the fundamental body of knowledge essential to Army CCOs. The 
manual is accessible to all military and civilian personnel with Army Knowledge Online 
(AKO) user access. 
Finally, the DAU recently added the course CON 334 Advanced Contingency 
Contracting to its curriculum. The course was developed as an advanced contingency 
contracting course, which would provide just-in-time training to senior-level contracting 
personnel deploying to contract management positions (USD [AT&L], 2008). Scheduled 
for launch in August 2010 as a four-day resident course, CON 334 is a follow-on course 
to CON 234 and will be offered approximately five times per year. 
In December 2004, Professor E. Cory Yoder published a working paper at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, “The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal Planning and 
Execution of Contingency Contracting”, which introduced a credential-based hierarchical 
tool that can assist mission planners in maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
contingency contracting operations. The personnel structure model is a conceptual 
framework that aligns theater-wide contracting support with a Combatant Commander’s 
(COCOM) operational objectives through integrative planning and execution. 
Specifically, the model improves a planning staff’s ability to determine the level of 
                                                 
2 51C is the military occupational specialty (MOS) code for U.S. Army contracting officers. 
3 The SMCT is a Soldier Training Publication (STP) published by the U.S. Army that provides a 
reference of individual skill sets for most MOS codes. It serves as a basic training tool for soldiers, 
instructors, and commanders. The term SMCT (51C) refers to the chapter that applies to Army CCOs, but 
the term is used interchangeably with SMCT throughout this report. 
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contracting resources needed to support a contingency operation.  It does this by 
identifying the optimal combination of capabilities and expertise needed by a theater-
wide corps of CCOs to accomplish the COCOM’s mission. The tool can, and should, be 
applied throughout all phases of a contingency operation, including during the 
development of contract support integration plans (CSIP), which align with operation 
plans (OPLAN) and operation orders (OPORD). 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) designated the DoD’s contract 
management environment—particularly contingency contracting—a “high-risk area” 
(GAO, 2010, p. 2). Since 9/11, the workload of contract actions4 has risen considerably 
in quantity and complexity. The combination of a thinning acquisition workforce, limited 
contingency contracting training resources, and procurement policies that often conflict 
with the operational requirements of contingency environments, has exacerbated the 
DoD’s inability to avoid substantial inefficiencies during nearly a decade of upswing in 
acquisition activity. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (2008a) 
committed the DoD to rebuilding its acquisition workforce in size and competency in 
response to faulty planning and execution of contracting support for the U.S. military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to the two wars, the convoluted and sluggish 
acquisition strategies inherent to large defense procurement programs shaped the 
acquisition workforce’s training model, which proved ineffectual for the rapid response 
requirements of post-9/11 contingency contracting operations. 
This research project examines the problem caused by an inefficient matriculation 
process for acquisition professionals that is more ad hoc than it is deliberate. The 
proliferation of contingency contracting courses and the standardization of contingency 
contracting practices across the DoD is still in its infancy. However, several important 
bodies of training, education, and literature were deployed and/or improved during the 
two wars: CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, the SMCT and the Yoder Three-tier Model. 
                                                 
4 The term contract action means any oral or written action that results in the purchase, rent, or lease 
of supplies or equipment, services, or construction, or modifications to these actions. 
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The Yoder Three-tier Model effectively links theater contracting requirements to the skill 
sets of the supporting CCO workforce. The tiers are credential-based at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. In addition, by altering its intended application, the 
model’s flexibility yields a tool to conduct a comparative analysis between contingency 
contracting courses through an examination of their respective learning objectives. CCOs, 
not unlike their counterparts who support large defense procurement programs, comprise 
various levels of capabilities depending on their formal training credentials and their 
experience.  We used the Yoder Three-tier Model to accomplish the following analyses: 
summarily compare each course on a sliding scale; determine the extent to which each 
course would benefit CCOs of varying targeted levels of proficiency; and validate the 
relative intent of each of the four contingency contracting courses (i.e., did the learning 
objectives “deliver as advertised” based on the courses’ descriptions and intended target 
audiences?). 
B. PURPOSE 
The business of contingency contracting is slowly leaving behind its untamed, ad 
hoc roots and is becoming recognized within the DoD as finally developing much-needed 
uniform processes; yet its processes must preserve a large degree of flexibility due to the 
nature of contingency operations. While acquisition policy and joint publications still 
lack comprehensive guidance on contingency contracting, the four courses (CON 234, 
CON 334, MN 3318 and the Army’s SMCT) are the most progressive educational 
resources the DoD has to educate its CCOs. With the exception of the DAU’s 
accreditation of MN 3318 as a CON 234 equivalency in 2004 (and subsequent re-
assessment in 2007), this research report is the first to dissect the four courses by their 
learning objectives and conduct a comparative analysis. We applied an important tool, the 
Yoder Three-tier Model, to accomplish this analysis. 
The overarching purpose of the research project is three-fold. First, by rating 
curricular learning objectives against an academic benchmark, we determined how the 
course content for the four contingency contracting courses compared to each other and 
how each one “spanned” the Yoder Three-tier Model. The four courses are the most 
 7
prevalent contingency contracting educational resources for acquisition professionals in 
the DoD today. The recently published Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook is 
another, however, we did not include this document in the analysis because the updated 
CON 234, and to a large degree MN 3318, is based on its content. The SMCT (51C), 
unlike the other three courses, is not certified by the DAU, nor does the Army intend for 
the SMCT (51C) to be certified as a CON 234 equivalent. However, the ACC desires a 
resource to augment its CCO workforce’s knowledge base because the Army—as the 
DoD’s primary ground combat maneuver force—must typically process significantly 
more contingency contracting actions than the other military services. The Army will 
continue to matriculate all of its CCOs into the DAU’s core contracting courses, 
including CON 234. 
Second, the research applied an important, yet largely underutilized, tool: the 
Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM). The YTTM promotes integrative planning and 
execution to support contingency contracting operations for the COCOMs. Its intent is to 
maximize effectiveness and efficiency for processes that have been regrettably 
underutilized, if used at all, and hence have failed over the last decade to obviate 
excessive waste, fraud, and abuse caused by a lack of oversight and foresight. A planning 
and execution aid, such as the YTTM, is a powerful, yet simple, way to authenticate 
CSIPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs, as well as to assist advanced CCOs and logisticians on 
the battlefield or in the midst of a disaster relief effort. We sought to promote a broader 
appreciation of this model by demonstrating its efficacy through an analysis of the 
contingency contacting courses. 
Third, we assisted the U.S. Army’s Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC), 
a subordinate unit to the ACC, in support of fielding a secure Web-based proficiency 
assessment test (PAT) for its 51C personnel. Arzu, Castro, and Mack (2010) developed 
the draft PAT in accordance with the content of the SMCT (51C). We completed the 
following tasks: conducted market research of Web-based test-building platforms; built 




program; coordinated two Web-based testing events; and analyzed PAT results. The 
PAT, via the Web-based test platform, was validated in June 2010 due to our research 
efforts. 
C. BACKGROUND 
Throughout history, the U.S. has utilized contractors to provide direct support to 
military forces engaged in contingencies spanning the range of military operations from 
major theater wars to humanitarian relief missions. For example, in the wake of the 7.0 
magnitude earthquake that devastated the country of Haiti on January 12, 2010, the first 
U.S. Army CCO was on the ground within two days to coordinate contracting actions for 
life-saving logistical, medical, and engineering services (ECC, 2010). Contractor-
provided services have also proven vital to U.S. troops involved in armed conflicts. For 
nearly a decade, contractors have supported U.S.-led military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by providing base operations support (e.g., food and housing); 
communication services; tactical and nontactical vehicle maintenance; interpreters who 
accompany military patrols; weapons systems maintenance; intelligence analysis; port 
activities; ammunition accountability and control; parts and equipment distribution; and 
private security. These services are provided in environments which are often 
characterized by asymmetric enemy tactics; terrorist threats; social norms and customs 
that are markedly different from those practiced in western cultures; underdeveloped 
transportation infrastructures; immature industrial and economic bases; fractured 
governance; and corruption. 
As of March 31, 2010, there were 250,335 contractor employees compared to 
approximately 272,000 uniformed personnel spanning the U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) theater providing logistics services in support of ongoing combat and 
stability operations (e.g., reconstruction and nation building) (CRS, 2010b). In other 
words, contractor personnel make up approximately 48% of the DoD’s combined 
contractor and uniformed personnel workforce in the USCENTCOM region, representing 
a 0.92:1 ratio between contractors and uniformed personnel. These estimates do not 
include non-U.S. coalition forces or the contractors managed by them, or the contractors 
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managed by multinational interagencies, nongovernment organizations (NGO), or private 
voluntary organizations (PVO). Contractors, it seems, have become an indispensable part 
of the U.S. military’s force structure in most contingency environments. This dependence 
will likely continue due to the following factors: the U.S. military’s scarce resources are 
unable to rapidly deploy everywhere at once in support of our domestic and foreign 
policies; the DoD relies heavily on commercial systems, components, and technologies to 
conduct disparate missions across the globe; military units deployed to austere 
environments often lack robust sustainment capabilities; and the current fiscal policy 
favors outsourcing of many non-combat services versus growing these “non value-added” 
capabilities within an increasingly expensive force of all-volunteer warfighters. 
On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. 
troops would be deployed to Afghanistan to assist ongoing operations in that country. 
Accordingly, the Congressional Research Service estimated that between 9,000 and 
43,000 additional contractors would be needed to support these additional troops (CRS, 
2010b). The Obama administration estimated the marginal cost to support the troop surge 
to be approximately $30 billion in the first year, although it is unclear how much, if any, 
would be spent on additional contractor support. The DoD has already spent billions of 
dollars on contractors supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office (2008), between fiscal years (FY) 2003 and 2006 the DoD 
obligated almost $76 billion for contracts in Iraq. In FY 2007 and the first half of FY 
2008, the DoD obligated approximately $30 billion on contractors for the conflicts in 
both countries (more than $5 billion for Afghanistan and approximately $25 billion for 
Iraq) (CBO, 2008). 
Despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq—the combat mission there is 
scheduled to end in August 2010—and the current administration’s policy to begin the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011, there remains an 
enduring requirement for the DoD to facilitate contractor support so long as the U.S. 
remains committed to resolutely influencing the future of the two countries’ security, 
economy, and government institutions. Consequently, as the U.S. reduces its military 
footprint and its role in direct combat operations in the region over the ensuing years, it is 
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likely that contracts that formerly supported troops will be replaced by contracts 
providing reconstruction, security, and other diplomatic programs. Various governmental 
organizations, such as the Department of State (DoS) and its humanitarian arm, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), will administer many of the contracts as 
they do today. However, barring a radical shift from the current U.S. policy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the DoD will continue to maintain a diminished presence in the countries in 
an “advise and assist” function (e.g., training local police and military forces). Therefore, 
the DoD’s acquisition workforce will remain in the region to manage contracts long after 
the U.S. terminates major combat and counterinsurgency operations there; the extent of 
their participation will be dictated by future defense appropriations. 
Since 9/11, the DoD—and particularly the Army, as its principal ground combat 
maneuver force in Iraq and Afghanistan—has failed to effectively and efficiently 
administer contracting actions in the austere environments where it is required to conduct 
contingency operations. The DoD, in this respect, neglected to address its shrinking 
acquisition workforce, whose congressionally mandated downsize began with the FY 
1996 Defense Authorization Act (1996). It also neglected to address the inadequacy of 
contracting skill sets across its atrophied workforce, despite the mounting number of 
increasingly complex contract actions borne from the global war on terror (GWOT). 
Moreover, the “Institutional Army,” in its role to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure 
the readiness of its fighting forces, compromised its own logistics channels on the 
battlefield by not instituting sorely-needed changes to the organizational structure, 
culture, career development, training resources, doctrine development, and regulations 
driving its procurement processes (Gansler et al., 2007). However, the Army began 
correcting these deficiencies in response to Urgent Reform Required: Army 
Expeditionary Contracting, a 2007 report completed by the Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler et al., 
2007), colloquially known as the “Gansler Commission.” The independent commission, 
chaired by the Honorable Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), was commissioned by the Secretary of the 
Army in response to the FY 2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 
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(2006) to review lessons learned in recent contingency operations and make 
recommendations to improve effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of procurement 
activities conducted in unfamiliar and hostile environments (Gansler et al., 2007). The 
U.S. Army continues to pursue and instigate improvements, which will be discussed in 
Chapter II of this report. The combination of a diminishing acquisition workforce, 
deficient contracting knowledge, and procurement policies that conflict with operational 
requirements inherent to contingency environments has exacerbated the DoD’s logistical 
support system, which profoundly relies on contingency contracting efforts to outfit and 
sustain the warfighters’ requirements. 
Contingency contracting, which shall be formally defined in Chapter II of this 
report, comprises the act of directing contracted support to tactical and operational forces 
engaged in contingency operations. Arzu et al. (2010) identify contingency contracting as 
“a niche subject area within the greater realm of defense contracting” (p. 15). The 
formulation of effective contingency contracting procedures, in this sense, has been 
historically disregarded in favor of ad hoc approaches. Large defense procurement 
programs and the deliberate, yet sluggish, acquisition strategies that steer them (i.e., 
phases of the Defense Acquisition Management System) have traditionally shaped 
policies that influence the acquisition workforce’s training requirements, to the detriment 
of post-9/11 contingency contracting operations. It was not until 1997 that the first DoD-
wide contingency contracting course was offered by the DAU (USD [AT&L], 2008). 
Known as CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting, it was not significantly updated for 
relevancy until after the Gansler Commission completed its 2007 report. Other 
contingency contracting training resources exist; however, only CON 234 (and the Joint 
Contingency Contracting Handbook on which it is based) and CON 334, mentioned 
earlier, are widely accessible to all acquisition communities across the DoD. MN 3318 is 
exclusively taught through the NPS and the SMCT (51C) is currently in draft format in 
limited distribution. Consequently, the proliferation of beneficial contingency contracting 
courses and the standardization of contingency contracting practices across the DoD is 
still in its infancy. 
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D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research was to summarily compare the following 
four courses: CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318 and the SMCT. To this end, we examined 
three factors: the relative similarities and differences between the four courses; the extent 
to which each course benefits CCOs of varying targeted levels of proficiency and 
credentials; and whether the intent of each course is met in relation to its course 
description and target audience. The analysis incorporated the use of a benchmark 
hierarchical model, the YTTM. We categorized curricular learning objectives across the 
YTTM hierarchy and, by applying a quantitative rating scheme to the model, 
differentiated the four courses. 
A secondary objective of this research was to determine the efficacy of the YTTM 
as an optimization tool for senior planners and commanders to use to align contracting 
resources with mission requirements. Its credibility as a personnel structure model has 
increased since it was conceptually introduced by Yoder in a 2004 working paper; we 
noted frequent references to the model by academic reports on contract management 
topics published by the NPS and the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). 
Additionally, “continued interest in the YTTM [has been] expressed by academics, force 
planners, and contracting offices from several agencies” (Yoder, 2004, p. 1). The YTTM 
was used by the Gansler Commission as the conceptual framework to help reshape the 
Army’s organizational structure for acquisition and contracting commands. Nevertheless, 
little empirical evidence exists to validate the efficacy of the YTTM. However, the 
objective of this report was not to examine empirical evidence of the model’s intended 
application (i.e., from CSIP to OPLAN to OPORD to execution of a contingency 
contracting operation). The objective was to demonstrate that, when applied correctly and 
consistently, the YTTM is an effective tool for differentiating contingency contracting 
courses and, by extension, resource criteria for authentic contingency contracting 
operations. 
A tertiary objective of this research was to assist the ECC in the fielding and 
validation of the PAT via a secure Web-based platform. Our research efforts in this 
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regard were time-intensive and included: conducting market research of Web-based test 
software, designing the user interface, inputting over 1,400 test questions, and analyzing 
examinee results from two testing events. The methodology pertaining to this effort and 
the results of the testing events are presented in Chapter V. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: 
1. How do CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318 and the SMCT compare? 
While our primary research question directly addresses the overarching theme of 
the primary research objective described in the previous section, three subsidiary research 
questions were also considered to better examine the primary research objective. In each 
case, the YTTM was used to answer the questions. The subsidiary research questions are: 
2. To what extent does each course benefit CCOs of varying targeted levels 
of proficiency? 
3. Is the intent of each course met in relation to its course description and 
targeted audience? 
The secondary research objective—to determine the efficacy of the YTTM as a 
suitable conceptual framework for senior planners and commanders—is not easily 
measurable because little empirical data exist from its genuine application of planning for 
contingency contracting operations. However, we attempted to demonstrate that the 
YTTM is an effective tool for differentiating contingency contracting courses. 
Accordingly, an additional subsidiary research question is offered as: 
4. Is the YTTM, although originally designed as a personnel structure model, 
an effective tool for comparing contingency contracting educational 
resources? 
Finally, we addressed the tertiary research objective by answering the following 
two subsidiary questions: 
5. How effective is the recommended Web-based testing platform in 
validating the PAT? 
6. Is this product a sustainable solution for the ECC? 
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F. SCOPE AND DELIVERABLES 
The scope of the report comprises the following research activities and is 
described below by chapter. 
 In Chapter I, we define the problem statement and research objectives, 
identify research questions, and develop methodologies that frame our 
research efforts. 
 In Chapter II, we conduct a literature review of relevant doctrine, policies, 
studies, and academic reports influencing training courses for CCOs. 
 In Chapter III, we identify primary and supporting learning objectives for 
CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the SMCT. 
 In Chapter IV, we comparatively analyze CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, 
and the SMCT by utilizing the Yoder Three-tier Model as a tool to 
differentiate the primary and supporting learning objectives of the courses. 
 In Chapter V, we examine the results of our market research for the Web-
based test software, describe the development of 36 full-length digital 
exams comprising the PATs developed by Arzu et al. (2010), and conduct 
a cursory analysis of examinee results and demographic data. 
 In Chapter VI, we answer the research questions, propose relevant 
recommendations, and discuss possible areas for future research. 
The work described in Chapter V additionally represents a “deliverable product” 
that we provided to the ECC. Our efforts facilitated the ECC’s ability to validate the draft 
PAT, thereby improving the effectiveness of the SMCT. The work also presented a viable 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) test delivery solution to the ECC that incorporates 
security, ease of content revision, and myriad analysis tools. 
G. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
We recognized the following limitations: 
 the course review does not consider contingency contracting resources 
other than the four courses (CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the 
SMCT). We recognize that other resources exist (e.g., the Joint 
Contingency Contracting Handbook); however, the study is limited to the 
four predominant formal training and educational courses; 
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 the research does not include surveys or interviews to examine the 
perceptions of CCOs, DAU faculty, administrators, acquisition 
professionals, commanders, or other subject matter experts in the 
contingency contracting field; 
 the research does not consider relevant lessons learned identified by CCOs 
recently deployed to contingency operations; 
 no empirical evidence exists from the practical application of the YTTM; 
 the administrative and security functions incorporated in the test software 
for the PAT are limited by the capabilities of the COTS test software; and 
 we cannot conduct a sound statistical analysis of the PAT examinee results 
due to the statistically insignificant number of examinees. 
We made the following assumptions: 
 the reader of this report understands fundamental contract management 
practices and processes intrinsic to DoD acquisition; 
 CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the SMCT incorporate the most 
relevant contingency contracting learning objectives available; 
 CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the SMCT learning objectives are 
unique and, therefore, may overlap each other’s course content on the 
YTTM; 
 CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the SMCT, as distinct entities, will 
likely “straddle” the hierarchical tiers of the YTTM; 
 some subjectivity is inherent to the course analysis. We incorporated 
measures to minimize the nature of subjectivity, and considered its 
influence in its conclusions and recommendations; and 
 the COTS test software used by the researchers is a temporary solution for 
the PAT validation. This premise guided our market research towards a 
lowest-price technically-acceptable (LPTA) approach. 
H. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research was conducted in four distinct, yet continuous, phases: literature 
review, course review, course analysis, and PAT validation. The PAT validation, 
presented in Chapter V of the report, was the first effort that we completed because it was 
 16
driven by the requirements and schedule of the ECC. However, it is presented last in the 
report because it was not our primary research objective. The course review logically 
preceded the course analysis, but the PAT validation spanned the other phases as a 
largely unrelated body of work. The methodology for the four phases of research is 
described below by section. 
Phase I: We conducted a literature review of relevant policy, regulations, joint 
doctrine, and studies in order to examine the contingency contracting environment and its 
impact on relevant training courses. The literature review included reports (GAO, CRS, 
CBO, RAND Corporation), joint publications, the FAR, academic reports, and 
commissioned studies, such as the Gansler Commission. Our intent during this phase was 
to develop the requisite knowledge of the current contingency contracting environment in 
order to determine the effectiveness of each course’s content for today’s practicing 
CCOs. 
Phase II: We reviewed the content for CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the 
SMCT. Specifically, we identified and defined the primary and supporting learning 
objectives for each course. This phase was necessary in order to prepare the material for 
analysis using the YTTM. 
Phase III: We applied the YTTM to the four courses. Specifically, we employed a 
quantitative rating scheme that represents the model’s hierarchical nature with respect to 
function, education, proficiency, and management level. The supporting learning 
objectives for each course were assigned a numerical value; each primary learning 
objective’s rating was determined as an average value of its supporting learning 
objectives. Each course was then “positioned” along the YTTM according to the 
composite results of its primary learning objectives. We nominally expanded the YTTM 
to four tiers in order to provide a greater degree of flexibility for rating the learning 
objectives. We considered the nature of subjectivity in rating the learning objectives; our 
measures to minimize subjectivity are described in Chapter IV. 
Phase IV: We conducted market research of Web-based test building platforms, 
built security and analysis parameters within the selected platform, input questions into 
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the software, coordinated two Web-based testing events, and analyzed examinee results. 
The market research for the COTS solution comprised a robust search of internet sites, 
solicitation of expertise from information technology and testing administration 
personnel throughout the NPS and the DoD, and interviews with test software vendors. 
We selected the product in accordance with a LPTA acquisition strategy. Following 
acquisition, we completed administrative requirements and data entry in accordance with 
guidance from the ECC. The ECC proctored two testing events in June 2010. 
Subsequently, we conducted a cursory analysis of the examinees’ results and 
demographic data. 
I. RESEARCH BENEFITS 
We recognized the following consequential benefits that this body of work may 
yield. 
 This body of work may provide senior planners and operational 
commanders with an academic assessment of the four most prevalent and 
relevant contingency contracting courses. The analysis presented in 
Chapter IV may provide leaders with the objective guidance to assist them 
in developing individual and unit training plans. Specifically, training 
needs could be aligned with our course assessment with respect to a 
CCO’s level of targeted proficiency, experience, and functional 
requirements, thereby optimizing the training resources available to a 
unit’s training department or the individual’s mentor. The course analysis 
additionally validates that the prescribed learning objectives meet the 
intent for which a particular course was designed. 
 Our application of the YTTM in this research may broaden its recognition 
as an effective contingency contracting operational planning and execution 
tool. The research, through demonstration that the YTTM is an effective 
tool for differentiating contingency contracting courses, may improve the 
model’s recognition as a robust instrument that should be applied before 
and during joint contingency contracting operations involving military and 
nonmilitary agencies. The research may also establish the YTTM as an 
integrative planning and execution tool for exclusively assessing an 
organization’s contracting skill sets and targeted resources. 
 Our research and administrative efforts will provide the ECC with a secure 
Web-based testing platform that will facilitate the validation of the PAT. 
This COTS product, a temporary approach that we proposed to the ECC 
following extensive market research, provides an economical test-
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proctoring service for the ECC until the command can conduct a detailed 
analysis of alternatives to procure a more permanent solution. The low-
cost testing software will allow the ECC to immediately disseminate and 
analyze the validity of the initial PAT to determine if it fairly assesses the 
knowledge base of examinees who have studied the SMCT (51C). 
Additionally, feedback from the initial PAT results may reshape the 
content and structure of the SMCT (51C), which is still in draft format. 
 This research project may advance the joint partnership between the NPS 
and the ECC. This undertaking is the second joint venture between the 
ECC and the NPS—the first produced the initial PAT (Arzu et al., 2010). 
We anticipate future joint projects between NPS military students who are 
assigned to the acquisition and contracting curricula (particularly Army 
officers) and the rapidly-expanding, but under-resourced, ECC. Mutually 
beneficial research may propagate from the two research projects, 
specifically from their suggested areas for further research. 
J. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
Chapter I, Introduction, provides a background for the four contingency 
contracting training courses that are examined in the report. This chapter presents the 
research questions and the methodology for conducting the research and identifies 
limitations and assumptions that affect the research conclusions. Additionally, it 
describes the purpose, objectives, scope, and benefits of the research. Chapter II, 
Contingency Contracting, is a literature review that provides a brief history of 
contingency contracting operations and examines current regulations, joint doctrine, and 
legislation. This chapter additionally describes problems and challenges within the 
contingency contracting environment, presents more detailed background of the four 
courses and the institutions that manage them, and discusses the YTTM in greater detail. 
This chapter reviews commissioned studies, joint publications, academic reports, and 
federal regulations to describe the relevant information. Chapter III, Course Review, 
presents course content, by primary and supporting learning objectives, for CON 234, 
CON 334, MN 3318, and the SMCT. Chapter IV, Course Analysis, describes in greater 
detail the methodology that we used for the analysis, and it reports the results of the 
course analysis. Chapter V, PAT Validation, describes our support efforts to the ECC 
including market research, test construction, administrative oversight, and examinee test 
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result analysis. Chapter VI, Conclusion and Recommendations, presents our responses to 
the research questions introduced in Chapter I, provides recommendations, and proposes 
areas for further research. 
K. SUMMARY 
Chapter I provided a background for the four contingency contracting training 
courses that will be examined in the report. It presented the research questions, the 
methodology for conducting the research, and identified the limitations and assumptions 
that may potentially affect our conclusions. Additionally, it described the purpose, 
objectives, scope, and benefits of the research. Chapter II provides a brief history of 
contingency contracting operations and examines current regulations, joint doctrine, and 
legislative enactments. This chapter additionally describes challenges in modern 
contingency contracting, discusses the organizations that created and manage the four 
educational courses, and presents the YTTM in greater detail. 
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II. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
Barring a complete overhaul of the DoD’s present human capital strategy, 
warfighters will inevitably depend on contractors to conduct future missions across the 
range of military operations. This dependence has been particularly manifested in post-
9/11 combat operations. The DoD reported to Congress in April 2008 that the missions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were the first major contingency operations to reflect the full 
impact of the shift to heavy reliance on contractor personnel for critical support functions 
in forward operating areas (OSD, 2008). Yet despite America’s long history of 
contingency contracting operations and its ever-increasing reliance on contracted support 
services in recent wars, the DoD has been slow to enact standardized contingency 
contracting processes and the training resources to champion them on behalf of its 
acquisition professionals. The Gansler Commission of 2007, and recent complementary 
initiatives across the DoD, finally brought to light the undesirable consequences of 
managing contingency contracting operations as a “pick-up game,” so labeled by one 
Army general to the Gansler Commission (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 41). As the U.S. 
military completes its combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan on a timetable predicated 
by the current administration, it may be prudent to the exploit lessons learned from 
modern contract management debacles to enable success in future contingency 
contracting operations. 
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 
testified to Congress in 2008 that the structure of the U.S. military has been adapted to an 
environment in which contractors are an indispensable part of the force (GAO, 2010). 
The preceding statement points to contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
Balkans—the three largest operations of the past 15 years—where contractors comprised 
approximately 50% of the DoD’s combined contractor and uniformed personnel 
workforce. (Figure 1 shows the relevant percentages, as of August 2008.) The DoD’s 
civilian personnel are excluded from the count because, as of September 8, 2009, their 
figures represented less than 1% of the total force in each of the three operations (CRS, 
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2010b). Additionally, Figure 2 illustrates the number of contractor personnel and troops 
in the USCENTCOM theater between March 2008 and September 2009. 
 
Figure 1.   Contractors as Percentage of Workforce in Recent Operations 
(From CBO, 2008, p. 13) 
 
Figure 2.   Number of Contractors in USCENTCOM vs. Troop Levels 

























The incorporation of contractors within the U.S. military’s force structure during 
conflicts of the previous 15 years, and throughout the history of contingency operations, 
has proven operationally beneficial. Specifically, the contractor workforce has bridged 
the widening gap between the dynamic requirements of the military’s operational 
commitments and the DoD’s limited capacity to execute contingency missions under an 
archaic human capital strategy. The U.S. military, in its effort to augment mission 
readiness through contractor support, exploits several enabling attributes that are inherent 
to the private sector, including: rapid deployment of capabilities by leveraging existing 
service industries and their large pools of human resources; realizing efficiencies through 
market competition and economies of scale; and tapping existing technologies and 
corporate knowledge. 
The CRS (2010a) contends that hiring contractors only as needed may be cheaper 
in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability. The true financial 
implications of hiring contractors versus resourcing capabilities from within are still 
unclear; various agencies continue to examine available data from the last decade. When 
considering overhead costs, training, employee benefits, technological and economic 
assumptions, and risk factors between the public and private labor pools, the conclusions 
become ambiguous. However, the affiliation between warfighter and contractor will 
likely continue due to several factors: contractors can be used to perform noncombat 
activities, which frees uniformed personnel to perform combat missions; contractors can 
be quickly deployed to provide critical support capabilities when necessary because they 
can be hired faster than the DoD can develop an internal capability; contractors can 
provide expertise in specialized fields that the DoD may not possess; and contractors can 
be hired when a particular need arises and subsequently let go when their services are no 
longer needed. For example, in 2008 the Army had a contract for 11,000 linguists 
because the DoD did not have the number of linguists needed (GAO, 2008b). 
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A. BRIEF HISTORY OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OPERATIONS 
Throughout history, the U.S. military has utilized contractors to provide direct 
support to military forces engaged in contingencies spanning the range of military 
operations from major theater wars to humanitarian relief missions. During the 
Revolutionary War, for example, the Continental Army hired wagon drivers and 
contracted with beef suppliers; the support also included clothing, weapons and basic 
engineering services (Thibault et al., 2009). Contracted services also sustained operations 
during the Civil War when contracting officers, then called quartermasters, were directly 
assigned to Army divisions conducting combat operations (Arzu et al., 2010). During 
World Wars I and II, forward-deployed contractor personnel played a diminished role 
because supplies and provisions were primarily shipped from the U.S. mainland to the 
respective theaters of war by contracting officers who remained stateside (Kirstein, 
2003). This arrangement proved both slow and inflexible in supporting the warfighter 
because goods often arrived long after the need for them had passed, resulting in severe 
shortages, or surpluses in some cases, while services were often limited to the innate 
capabilities of the military’s fielded units. 
Contingency contracting operations matured appreciably during the Korean War. 
CCOs leveraged local Korean and Japanese vendors to provide extensive support to the 
war effort, thereby reducing the need for supply shipments from the U.S. and improving 
base operations support by utilizing host nation resources and labor. The Korean War 
marked the first time that the U.S. launched an ambitious local procurement agenda to 
support a contingency operation, and the effort yielded a flexible supply chain that was 
responsive to the warfighters’ needs (Kirstein, 2003). Conversely, contingency 
contracting actions during the Vietnam conflict were largely subdued. Arzu et al. (2010) 
attribute the dismal contracting circumstances to the fact that the U.S. Congress declined 
to declare the Vietnam situation a formal war, resulting in inadequate political and fiscal 
resources to broaden the contracting landscape. However, contracted support did play an 
indispensable role in the Vietnam conflict, albeit not akin to the magnitude of local 
procurement programs seen in the Korean War. 
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During the post-Cold War 1990s, the DoD implemented substantial logistics and 
support personnel reductions, leading to increased reliance on contractor support. By this 
time, contractor-supported services had become a mainstay in U.S. military contingency 
operations. The decade observed a remarkable increase in contract actions, which 
collectively grew more complex despite a decreasing number of acquisition personnel to 
manage the workload. Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, which occurred at the 
precipice of the DoD cuts, were augmented by unprecedented contracting support to the 
warfighters (Kirstein, 2003). The CRS (2010a) notes that the DoD disposed of many in-
house capabilities prior to the U.S. engagement in the NATO peacekeeping mission in 
the Balkans, forcing the DoD to hire more contractors to fulfill the new shortfalls. By any 
measure, the dawn of the U.S. military’s inordinate dependence on contractor-provided 
services for contingency operations was observed during these nascent years of the 
1990s. 
Today, over 250,000 contractor employees span the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia, providing logistics services to U.S. forces in support of combat missions, stability 
operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian relief efforts. The services provided 
include base operations support (e.g., food and housing), communication services, 
tactical and nontactical vehicle maintenance, interpreters who accompany military 
patrols, weapons systems maintenance, intelligence analysis, port activities, ammunition 
accountability and control, parts and equipment distribution, and private security. For 
example, in Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army uses multiple contractor 
firms to refurbish and repair a variety of military vehicles for its warfighters (GAO, 
2010). Figure 3 illustrates the types of contracted services (by relative share) supporting 
U.S. military operations, for instance, in Iraq. 
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Figure 3.   DoD Contractor Personell by Type of Service Provided in Iraq (From CRS, 
2010a, p. 8) 
The DoD’s contingency contractor workforce is comprised largely of non-U.S. 
citizens. Tables 1 and 2, for example, report international profile distributions for the 
DoD’s contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan as of March 2010. By design, 
contingency contracting operations should leverage local and regional labor sources to 
the most practical extent possible, while weighing security issues, diplomacy, feasibility, 
and overall responsiveness to the warfighters’ needs. 
 
Table 1.   DoD Contractor Personnel in Iraq (From CRS, 2010b, p. 9) 
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Table 2.   DoD Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan (From CRS, 2010b, p. 12) 
 
The ratio of contractors to military personnel in the USCENTCOM theater is 
roughly 0.92:1 effective March 2010, as shown in Table 3. Table 3 neither specifies the 
number of contractors and troops located outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, nor 
USCENTCOM personnel deployed to non-USCENTCOM locations (e.g., Philippines, 
Djibouti, Egypt). 
 
Table 3.   USCENTCOM Contractor Personnel to Troops Comparison (From CRS, 
2010b, p. 5) 
 
*Refers to USCENTCOM area of responsibility 
The evolution of contingency contracting since the Revolutionary War is a 
chronological reflection of the types of operations in which the U.S. has participated, its 
military’s force structure, and the operating environments’ local and regional political, 
economic, and security circumstances. Additionally, the prevailing contingency 
contracting practices during each operation were steered by America’s overarching 
legislative, regulatory, and fiscal boundaries of the time. Figure 4 identifies the evolution 
of contractor-provided services on which U.S. combat forces have grown to rely. Figure 4 
also demonstrates the increasing complexity of contracted services over time and the ratio 




Figure 4.   Evolution of Contracted Support in U.S. Military Operations (From Thibault et 
al., 2009, p. 21) 
To be sure, advances in warfare and technology have expanded the functions and 
responsibilities of contractors in contingency operations and the U.S. military’s reliance 
on these contracted services. However, the DoD’s ability to manage contracts for these 
contemporary requirements has been historically inadequate. Barbaris and Callanan 
(2008) identified four key areas that shaped (during the previous 15 years) the present 
contingency contracting environment. These areas are (a) the changing war environment, 
(b) the increased contracting workload and complexity of contract actions, (c) the 
increased responsibility of acquisition professionals, and (d) the declining capability of 
the acquisition workforce. History demonstrates that these key areas will change as a 
function of warfare type, technology, force structure, global economic climate, 
diplomatic policies, and regulatory contracting parameters. 
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The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan identified a 
number of institutional factors that led the government to its current situation, in which 
contractor support has become critical to contingency mission success. These factors 
include: 
 lack of adequate contingency planning in advance of operations; 
 lack of federal employees with the appropriate skills to perform the 
services; 
 reduction of the military force structure and limits on the total number of 
military personnel authorized by Congress; 
 requirements process for deciding the number of positions needed in the 
force structure; and 
 relative ease of contracting for a service compared to the lengthy process 
of hiring civilian personnel. (Thibault et al., 2009, p. 21) 
Given these factors, it is extraordinary that until recently, contingency contracting 
was done on an ad hoc basis and was inadequately incorporated into the doctrine and 
culture of the U.S. military. The combination of these observations and a regulatory 
environment that often conflicted with contracting requirements inherent to contingency 
operations exacerbated the DoD’s logistical support system, which implicitly relied on 
contingency contracting actions to outfit the warfighters’ requirements. Consequently, 
contingency contracting has been disregarded as a discrete proficiency within the DoD’s 
acquisition workforce. The standardization of contingency contracting processes across 
the DoD and effective courses to inculcate best practices among the CCO corps is still in 
its infancy. 
B. THE CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
The contingency environments in which contracted services are required are 
typically characterized by some of the following conditions such as, enemy warfare 
(regular and irregular tactics), terrorist threats, social norms and customs that are 
markedly different from those practiced in western cultures, underdeveloped 
transportation infrastructures, immature industrial and economic bases, fractured 
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governance, and corruption. Moreover, hostilities and security threats may break out at 
any time during contingency operations. Therefore, the CCO is obliged to rapidly 
develop and preserve a robust contracting environment to neutralize the adverse effects of 
hostilities when they do occur. 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook identifies the following 
unavoidable problems that occur when hostilities break out during contingency 
operations: 
• Contractor employees may not report for work, or may abandon the job 
site, or refuse to drive vehicles in certain areas. 
• Vendors and shops may close during hours of darkness or cease 
operations. 
• The threat of snipers, terrorists, and enemy action against the CCO while 
traveling in the local community increases significantly. (DPAP, 2008, p. 
107) 
The more mature the contingency contracting operation, the better support the 
CCO will be able to provide the warfighter. Accordingly, CCOs must consider the 
expected level of maturity when planning for contingency contracting operations and 
bring with them the appropriate contracting “tools” based on that assessment. 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook defines an immature contracting 
environment as “an area with little or no built-up infrastructure and few vendors. Of the 
available vendors few, if any, have previous experience contracting with the U.S.” 
(DPAP, 2008, p. 107). For example, in the wake of the massive January 2010 earthquake 
that devastated Haiti, Army CCOs were tasked with coordinating contracting actions for 
life-saving logistical, medical, and engineering services in a country already plagued by 
an underdeveloped infrastructure, despondent industrial and economic bases, and a 
fractured government. Yoder (2004) states that “underground networks for food, shelter, 
safety and security, and a loss of traditional motivators to which many domestic 




example of an immature contracting environment is the Horn of Africa in countries such 
as Djibouti where the U.S. military’s continuous presence since 2002 has supported 
counterterrorism operations and diplomatic missions. 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook defines a mature contracting 
environment as one characterized by: 
A sophisticated distribution system that can rapidly respond to changing 
requirements and priorities; sufficient vendors who can comply with FAR 
requirements in order to meet contingency contracting demands and have 
previous experience contracting with the US government; and, in the best 
case, where there is an existing DoD contracting office or structure in 
place. Examples of mature contracting environments include Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Korea, and Western Europe. (DPAP, 2008, pp. 106–
107) 
Yoder (2003) adds that “mature [contingency contracting] environments likely 
have several, or all, of the following: host-nation support agreements; financial systems 
able to support complex transactions; robust transportation networks; and business 
capacity, capability, and willingness” (p. 9). 
Recognition of, and adherence to, a contract “rule of law” by local and regional 
vendors also influences the contingency contracting environment. To be binding, a 
contract must have six elements: offer, acceptance, consideration, execution by 
competent parties, legality of purpose, and clear terms and conditions (Cibinic & Nash, 
1998). “The CCO may find that these [six] universal parameters are subject to varied 
interpretation; therefore, they may be valued as tenets in a significantly different manner 
than what may be considered customary by domestic and developed international 
standards” (Yoder, 2004, p. 4). Therefore, the lack of credible contractors in some 
contingency environments may exacerbate circumstances in an already challenging, and 
often austere, situation. 
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1. Contingency Contracting Defined 
Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support defines contingency 
contracting as the following: 
Contingency contracting is the process of obtaining goods, services, and 
construction from commercial sources via contracting means in support of 
contingency operations. Contingency contracting is a subset of contract 
support integration and does not include the requirements development, 
prioritization, and budgeting processes. … Contracts used in a 
contingency include theater support, systems support, and external support 
contracts. (CJCS, 2008, pp. I-2, I-3) 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook defines contingency contracting as 
“direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum 
of armed conflict and noncombat contingency operations, both domestic and overseas” 
(DPAP, 2008, p. 99). 
There are some nuances in each definition. Joint Publication 4-10 suggests that 
requirements determination and prioritization are not elements of contingency 
contracting. This contradicts the significance of integrative contract support planning in 
advance of contingency operations, which is advocated by the YTTM, the Commission 
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 56. The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook limits its definition to “direct 
contracting support,” which does not clearly describe what constitutes the entire 
contingency operation’s supply chain (i.e., which contracting actions and personnel are 
“directly” contributing to the logistical support at the local, theater, or multi-theater 
levels). To complicate matters, the Gansler Commission (Gansler et al., 2007) uses the 
term expeditionary rather than contingency throughout its report because it believes the 
term better defines national defense and national security missions in a broader sense. 
However, in most cases, the contingency contracting definitions that we 
encountered during the literature review are generally congruent with respect to the 
fundamental act of directing contracted support for contingency operations. The semantic 
distinctions above are less important to the warfighter than the assurance of mission 
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success through implementation of standardized, effective, and flexible contingency 
contracting processes. Contingency operations, and their phases, are described in the next 
two sections. 
2. Types of Contingency Operations 
Likewise noted in the previous section on contingency contracting definitions, we 
observed nuances between literature describing types of military contingency operations. 
Yoder (2004) describes a contingency operation as “an event which requires the 
deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive 
activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or other military operations” (p. 
5). 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook identifies the following four types 
of contingency operations that contracted services may directly support: “major theater 
wars, smaller-scale contingencies, noncombat contingency operations, and domestic 
disasters or emergency relief” (DPAP, 2008, p. 99). The handbook additionally states that 
contingency operations may include military training exercises, routine installation and 
base operations, and systems or inventory control point contracting within the continental 
U.S. (CONUS) and outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS). Yoder (2003) adds that 
“[contingency operations] may exist across the full spectrum of war and during military 
operations other than war (MOOTW)…including nation building, stability operations, 
extraction and/or evacuation operations, and peace-keeping operations” (p. 8). Joint 
doctrine has since disregarded the term MOOTW and has encompassed the concept 
within a range of military operations, or ROMO (i.e., spanning major theater wars to 
humanitarian relief missions). However, Yoder’s treatment of contingency operations 
throughout his publications and his application of contingency contracting principles 
remains applicable. 
Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations (CJCS, 2010) refers to contingencies in the 
context of “crisis response and limited contingency operations” (p. VI-1). Within the 
section of the document about ROMO, it describes crisis response and limited 
contingency operations in the following way: 
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Typical crisis response and limited contingency operations include 
noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, foreign 
humanitarian assistance, recovery operations, consequence management, 
strikes, raids, homeland defense operations, and civil support operations. 
(CJCS, 2010, p. xxiv) 
The publication continues its discussion on crisis response and limited 
contingency operations in Chapter I, Strategic Context, as follows: 
A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-
scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation 
of extended duration involving combat. … A limited contingency 
operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which 
joint operation planning is required and an OPLAN or OPORD is 
developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on 
the circumstances. Included are operations to ensure the safety of 
American citizens and U.S. interests while maintaining and improving 
U.S. ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile 
ambitions of potential aggressors. (CJCS, 2010, p. I-9) 
The publication neither expands on, nor further defines, its description of 
contingency operations beyond the above text. The document simply presents the concept 
of a contingency operation as one of many possible military events that may occur within 
the overarching framework of the ROMO5. This restrained reference to contingency 
operations obfuscates the fundamental notions that most military operations are 
comprised of contingency operations and that effective contingency contracting is vital to 
the success of contingency operations. Joint Publication 3-0 often speaks to advance 
planning for OPLANs and OPORDs across the full ROMO; yet, the document seldom 
discusses contracted logistic support and does not reference CSIPs (CJCS, 2010). 
Conversely, the Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support extols CSIPs as an 
integral contribution to OPLANs and OPORDs (CJCS, 2008). Therefore, we conclude 
that contingency operations are pervasive across the entire ROMO, from major theater 
                                                 
5 Joint Publication 3-0 contends that “military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity 
within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to 
crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns” 
(CJCS, 2010, p. I-7). 
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wars to humanitarian relief missions, and that contingency contracting is a fundamental, 
but often neglected, element of U.S. military operations. 
3. Declared vs. Nondeclared Contingency Operations 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook states that in accordance with Title 
10 U.S. Code (USC) §101(a)(13), a declared contingency operation of the DoD may be: 
 designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the armed forces 
become involved in military actions against an enemy of the U.S. 
 declared by the President or the Congress when members of the uniformed 
forces are called to active duty (a reserve component mobilization) under 
Title 10 USC, or any provision of law during a declared war or national 
emergency. (DPAP, 2008, p. 103) 
The formal declaration of a contingency operation is significant for a CCO. It 
triggers Title 10 USC §2302(7) which, among other actions, modifies the following 
regulations: 
 increases the Micro Purchase threshold from $3,000 to: CONUS = 
$15,000, OCONUS = $25,000; 
 increases the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) from $100,000 to: 
CONUS = $250,000, OCONUS = $1,000,000; 
 removes the requirement to synopsize contract requirements in accordance 
with FAR 5.2; and 
 eases provisions to waive the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). 
(DPAP, 2008, pp. 99-100) 
Under officially declared contingencies, many provisions of the FAR and most 
service regulations and policies are relaxed, streamlined, or even eliminated, potentially 
making the contracting processes of supporting operations in contingent environments 
more efficient and effective (Yoder, 2004). The FAR provides little specific guidance for 
operating under declared contingencies; however, it includes some general provisions as 
stated in Subpart 18.2—Emergency Acquisition Flexibilities. 
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(b) Micro-purchase threshold. The threshold increases when the head of the 
agency determines the supplies or services are to be used to support a contingency 
operation. 
(c) Simplified acquisition threshold. The threshold increases when the head of 
the agency determines the supplies or services are to be used to support a 
contingency operation. 
(d) SF 44, Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher. The normal threshold for the use 
of the SF 44 is at or below the micro-purchase threshold. Agencies may, however, 
establish higher dollar limitations for purchases made to support a contingency 
operation. 
(e) Test program for certain commercial items. The threshold limits 
authorized for use of the test program may be increased for acquisitions to support 
a contingency operation. (FAR, 2005, p. 18.2-1) 
Nondeclared contingency operations comprise all contingency operations not 
previously described. The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook states that “in a 
nondeclared contingency operation, the SAT threshold is $100,000, except for 
acquisitions of supplies or services that, as determined by the head of the agency, are to 
be used to support a contingency operation or to facilitate defense against or recovery 
from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack” (DPAP, 2008, p. 104). 
4. Operational Phases 
Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008) describes the 
manner in which contracting support generally shifts within each operational phase. The 
phases include: mobilization and initial deployment; joint reception, staging, onward 
movement, and integration (RSOI) and employment of forces; sustainment; and finally, 
redeployment. Contracting support within these four stages, according to the publication, 
are generally characterized by the types of services and items purchased and the types of 
contracting mechanisms used to support specific force requirements. The phases 
described in the publication are analogous to the processes discussed in Joint Publication 
3-35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations (CJCS, 2007b), which are identified as 
deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. 
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a. Mobilization and Initial Deployment 
This is normally the first 30-45 days of a deployment and is characterized 
by an extremely high operating tempo, confusion and controlled chaos. 
The CCO’s first priority is to respond to basic life support requirements. 
… During this phase, CCOs may find themselves in the undesirable 
position of being the requestor, approving official, certifying officer, and 
transportation office for deliveries. Detailed planning may preclude some 
of these additional duties; however, physical limitations on the number of 
support personnel deployed in the early stages of a contingency will 
require a high degree of flexibility on the part of the CCO. … The actual 
mix of contracting or other support mechanisms…will be based on risk, 
reliability, and availability of these various sources of support. … It is 
imperative that prior to the main body deployment, the supported 
[COCOM] should ensure that theater support contracting and civil 
augmentation program (CAP) management organizations are deployed as 
part of the advanced echelon so that the CCO may [rapidly] set up [initial] 
required life support functions. Contracting at this time of the operation is 
generally focused on expediting contract award. (CJCS, 2008, p. III-19)  
b. Joint RSOI and Employment of Forces 
During this phase, contracting personnel (military and civilian) and 
contractor personnel will continue to arrive, though not necessarily at a 
rate commensurate with the number of troops to be supported. In major 
operations, a mix of theater support and external support contracts, 
including [CAP] and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) prime vendor 
contracts may be extensively utilized. (CJCS, 2008, pp. III-19, 20) 
Yoder (2003) gives the following examples as likely contracting activities that 
may occur within this phase: “construction and infrastructure, habitability, quality of life 
improvements, establishing a solid and reliable vendor base, and ensuring contracting 
control and administration” (p. 12). Joint Publication 4-10 continues its description of 
this phase, noting that acquisition professionals should develop their contracting 
processes commensurate with a more mature contingency environment. 
During this period, a requirements requisitioning controls process will be 
established. Theater support contracting efforts will still be heavily 
involved with the acquisition of basic troop support requirements that are 
not covered by CAP task orders or other means of support. Contracting 
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should move [towards] more long-term contracting arrangements such 
as…Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items or blanket purchase 
agreements. (CJCS, 2008, p. III-20) 
c. Sustainment 
This stage is characterized by a focus on file documentation, cost 
reduction, and establishing business efficiencies. The CCO’s role may 
change from a strict focus on requirements fulfillment to [that of a] 
business advisor. [The COCOM] should…move away from cost-plus 
award-fee CAP task orders and emergency procurement towards long-
term contracts, such as indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity or 
requirements contracts. Requirements will become more defined and 
consolidated and the use of performance based contracting methods will 
be maximized when possible. The transition of CAP task orders to long-
term theater support contracts is dependent on specific mission factors 
such as threat-level and the availability of a reliable, local commercial 
vendor base. [CCOs] should have formal processes and controls in place 
to ensure accountability for all contractor acquired government owned 
(CAGO) equipment and government furnished equipment (GFE); begin 
settling contractor claims; make arrangements to ensure final payments are 
made; and develop contract termination procedures. (CJCS, 2008, p. III-
20) 
Yoder (2003) adds that “at this phase, some initially immature environments may 
exhibit attributes of a mature environment—but not always” (p. 13). He also suggests that 
the following improvements be put into effect during the sustainment phase: increase 
competition in the vendor base, shift from “push” to “pull” contracts for items and 
services not supplied from within the theater, and enhance and refine internal controls. 
The final operational phase identified in Joint Publication 4-10, redeployment, is 
often the most neglected. Senior planners and operational commanders, driven by the 
necessity to rapidly prepare for new military operations, have historically eschewed the 





This phase is characterized by significant pressure and urgency to send the 
troops home. … The CCO will be required to terminate and close out 
existing contracts and orders. Ratifications and claims must be processed 
to completion. Contracting for life support services and base operations 
must continue until the last troop leaves. During this stage, [CCOs] should 
ensure accountability and begin disposition of CAGO equipment and 
GFE. When a follow-on force is required, the CCO must prepare contracts 
and files for delegation or assignment to the incoming contracting agency. 
… To the extent any contracts remain open, …arrangements should be 
made to transition them to successor organizations such as permanent 
organizational elements. (CJCS, 2008, pp. III-20, 21) 
Yoder (2003) advises that contracting operations supporting this phase “should 
complement the overall exit strategy…while [sustaining] continued priority for basic life 
support and security” (p. 14). The level of effort required for this phase is often 
underestimated because the disposition of material and closeout of contracts—like those 
comparable actions required during the disposal phase of large defense procurement 
programs—represent a trivial percentage (in cost and time) of the entire contingency 
contracting operation. Yet, the rigorous execution of redeployment contracting actions 
should be no less significant than the contracting responsibilities that comprise the prior 
three operational phases. 
5. Advance Planning 
The literature review conducted for this report uncovered an overarching theme 
that, until recently, was largely absent from the contingency contracting environment: 
advance planning. The lack of integrative planning was identified by the Gansler 
Commission’s report, and similar studies, as a fundamental reason that the DoD has 
failed to effectively and efficiently administer contracting actions in the austere 
environments where U.S. forces conduct contingency operations. The previous three 
sections discussed the types of contingency operations that contracting supports, declared 
vs. nondeclared contingencies, and the doctrinal phases of military operations. Advance 
planning, as the term suggests, should precede the commencement of contingency 
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contracting operations to the greatest extent practicable (i.e., before initial deployment of 
military forces). The topic of advance planning is briefly addressed here to emphasize its 
significance in joint policy and its significance in the application of the YTTM. 
Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contract Support calls for the DoD to 
“identify contract support requirements as early as possible, to ensure that the military 
receives contract support at the right place, at the right time, and for the right price” 
(CJCS, 2008, p. III-11). Joint Publication 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters directs the 
COCOM “to identify operational contract support requirements as well as develop plans 
to obtain and manage contract support and include them in OPLANs, OPORDs, or 
fragmentary orders (FRAGO)” (CJCS, 2007a, p. C-7). Finally, Joint Publication 3-35 
Deployment and Redeployment Operations states that “contracting support is another 
force multiplier and…should be planned and coordinated in advance of an actual 
deployment” (CJCS, 2007b, p. VI-9). It is clear from these three sources that advance 
planning for contingency contracting operations is not only essential, but also directed. 
While joint publications do not supersede service-specific doctrine, they provide 
overarching guidance that influences the interoperability of multi-service and multi-
agency missions, and presently most military operations are joint in nature. 
Considering the monumental reforms that have recently affected the joint 
contracting environment, mission planners should consider the YTTM, which is a 
hierarchical tool that can assist joint staffs in aligning theater-wide contracting support 
with a COCOM’s operational objectives. The model enables integrative planning in 
support of contingency contracting operations. The YTTM can facilitate the development 
of CSIPs, and it can authenticate proposed contract support for OPLANs and OPORDs. 
However, its premise is that it is most effective when joint staffs (i.e., logisticians and 
contracting professionals) utilize it prior to initial deployment, which is the essence of 
advance planning. 
Given the above discussion on advance planning, we recognize that these joint 
publications do not incorporate a planning operational phase that precedes the 
mobilization and initial deployment phase. While the three joint publications cited in this 
section mandate advance planning prior to contingency contracting operations, the 
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requisite assurances of its implementation are merely implied without designating these 
responsibilities within a formal operational phase. The lack of a prescribed planning 
agenda increases the risk of failing to deliver effective contract support to the warfighters. 
Joint doctrine should enhance its treatment of the planning element for contingency 
contracting operations because contracted services have become an indispensable 
element of the U.S. military’s capability in most contingency environments. 
C. PROBLEMS IN MODERN CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
ENVIRONMENTS 
This section identifies several problems and challenges within modern 
contingency contracting environments. Although the issues that we discuss here have all 
been brought to light in the findings and recommendations of the Gansler Commission, 
none of the research is exclusive to that report; the topics have been critically examined 
in other studies as well, including GAO, CRS, and academic reports (e.g., GAO, 2007; 
CRS, 2010a; Luse et al., 2005). Our intent in presenting these issues is to develop the 
requisite background knowledge of the current contingency contracting environment in 
order to determine the effectiveness of available training resources for today’s practicing 
CCOs. 
1. Downsized Acquisition Workforce 
A recent GAO report (2010) stated that “having the right people with the right 
skills to oversee contractor performance is crucial to ensuring that the DoD receives the 
best value for the billions of dollars it spends annually on contractor-provided services 
that support contingency operations” (p. 6). However, numerous studies confirm, that the 
DoD does not have a sufficient number of acquisition professionals, particularly at 
deployed locations, to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent in a judicious manner (CRS, 
2010a). For example, in her testimony before Congress, the GAO’s Managing Director of 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management reported that if adequate staffing had been in 
place, the U.S. Army could have realized substantial savings on service and procurement 
contracts in Iraq (GAO, 2007). 
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The Gansler Commission (Gansler et al., 2007) reported that the U.S. Army’s 
acquisition professionals comprise approximately 5,500 people. Although the level has 
remained relatively stable since 1996, the year Congress mandated a 25% DoD-wide 
acquisition workforce reduction over five years, it provides the Army a dangerously 
insufficient capacity to direct contracted support to its forces engaged in contingency 
operations. This shortfall has been pervasive across the military branches during the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it remains a problem in 2010. While the GAO has found no 
DoD guidelines regarding the appropriate number of personnel needed to oversee and 
manage DoD contracts at deployed locations, reviews by the GAO and the DoD 
consistently encounter significant deficiencies in contract management due to the 
inadequate number of acquisition professionals available to carry out planning, 
administration, and oversight duties (GAO, 2010). For example, relevant GAO reports 
have consistently reported on the DoD’s inability to provide an adequate number of 
contract management and oversight personnel in USCENTCOM’s theater of operation 
(GAO, 2004; 2006; 2008b). Moreover, the GAO’s ongoing study in Iraq and Afghanistan 
demonstrates that this problem has not been resolved (GAO, 2010). 
In May 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced a plan to bolster the acquisition 
workforce with the objective of growing the community by about 20,000 personnel by 
2015. This initiative symbolizes a fundamental overhaul of the DoD’s approach to 
contract management, aiming to reduce personnel shortages in order to improve support 
to the contingency contracting mission (Thibault, 2009). In a speech introducing the plan, 
Secretary Gates stated that “[The DoD must] adequately staff the government acquisition 
team and provide disciplined and constant oversight. … This [plan] will support these 
goals by increasing the size of the defense acquisition workforce, converting 11,000 
contractors and hiring an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 
2015—beginning with 4,100 in FY 2010” (Gates, 2009, para. 19, 22). 
The initiative is not without challenges. The DoD’s acquisition workforce was 
downsized by more than 50% between 1994 and 2005 (CRS, 2010a). During that period, 
Congress and the DoD were at odds over the need for further reductions in the defense 
acquisition workforce. Congress viewed the cutbacks as a necessary requirement for 
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eliminating wasteful spending and providing the DoD with increased funding for other 
priorities (CRS, 2010a). This setting stressed the acquisition profession’s human 
resources, culture, and career path; the profession is mending slowly and still needs repair 
from the resulting damage. Presently, there remains an acute shortage of federal 
procurement professionals with 5 to 15 years of experience (GAO, 2008a). This shortage 
may become even more pronounced in the near term; by 2010, half of the federal 
acquisition workforce will be eligible to retire (Assad, 2006). 
Figure 5 illustrates the growing disparity between the acquisition workforce and 
its workload. The reduction in contracting personnel accelerated in response to the FY 
1996 Defense Authorization Act requirement at the same time that procurement actions 
began to increase. The figure concludes with 2004 data; however, today in 2010, the gap 
has grown wider. 
 
Figure 5.   DoD Acquisition Workforce and Workload Trends (From Gansler et al., 2007, p. 
30) 
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2. Escalating Quantity of Contract Actions 
The personnel shortages described in the previous section have become just part 
of a larger, systemic problem within the DoD. The post-Cold War cutbacks that reduced 
the size and shape of the entire DoD in the 1990s, including its acquisition workforce, 
triggered the unanticipated consequence of increasing the number of service contracts 
required to sustain the fighting capabilities of the U.S. military. It was generally assumed 
that, in an environment of decreased spending, outsourcing would efficiently replace 
subsidiary elements of the force structure, and that the number of individuals required to 
manage those contracts could be significantly reduced as a result of perceived 
improvements in management processes, training, and technology (Gansler et al, 2007). 
However, the unforeseen spending increase that began in FY 1996, which overlapped 
contingency operations in the Balkans, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq, upset a fiscal 
strategy based on resource management decisions meant for an otherwise static 
environment. 
The effects of the 1990s’ outsourcing strategy spilled over into the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Some officials have asserted that there were not enough 
experienced DoD contracting officials available to manage the deluge of service contracts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to oversee the private sector contractors who were paid 
billions of dollars each year (CRS, 2010a). Between FYs 2001 and 2008, the DoD’s 
reported obligations on all service contracts, measured in realdollar terms, more than 
doubled, from approximately $92 billion to $210 billion. In FY 2008, the obligation 
included more than $25 billion for services to support contingency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (GAO, 2009). The U.S. Army, the DoD’s primary ground combat maneuver 
force, typically managed more contingency contracting actions than any other military 
service. Figure 6 demonstrates that the dollar value for the U.S. Army’s service contracts 
increased from $23.3 billion in 1992, to $100.6 billion in 2006; the corresponding 
contract actions increased 654% from approximately 52,900 to 398,700. 
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Figure 6.   U.S. Army Contracting Workload (From Gansler et al., 2007, p. 31) 
3. Increasingly Complex Service Contracts 
Aggressive outsourcing of support services during the last 15 years has created an 
increasingly complex environment for acquisition professionals. The Gansler 
Commission (Gansler et al., 2007) provides a case in point demonstrating this rationale. 
For example, a service contract that provides food to warfighters in a remote and 
dangerous location must often be administered with very little time, information, or local 
resources to support the requirement. The CCO does not have the luxury, in this case, to 
wait on a staff of engineers that will define warfighters’ requirements over the course of 
many years, to consult with industry experts, or to rapidly deploy a COTS solution 
downrange. Furthermore, a food service contract in Fallujah, Iraq, may not look the same 
as a food service contract in Mosul, Iraq, or Kandahar, Afghanistan, or Zamboagna, 
Philippines. Conversely, a typical defense procurement program, such as for the 
production of a tank, is based on deliberate criteria for detailed design and performance 
specifications, which are just a few of the elements that are formally regulated by the 
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Defense Acquisition Management System over the tank’s entire life-cycle, from concept 
development to the tank’s disposal. The total investment in the tank project comprises 
relatively vast resources: personnel (DoD and private sector); design, testing, and 
production facilities; myriad acquisition strategies; operational training and support; and 
time. Although the design criteria that influence the tank’s work breakdown structure far 
exceed the number of parameters that shape the aforementioned food contract, the 
constraints inherent in a contingency operation make the delivery of food services a 
considerably more challenging feat than the delivery of a tank. 
Service contracts that support contingency operations, as established in the 
previous example, tend to be more complex than is widely appreciated. Disparate 
contracting coordination within and across theaters, lack of integrative planning, and 
inadequate training resources have further exacerbated the complexity. For example, 
between FYs 2003 and 2005, a RAND Corporation study indicated that CCOs in 15 
different organizations across the USCENTCOM theater purchased bottled water through 
38 contracts from more than 30 suppliers (RAND, 2008). While local circumstances may 
have driven unique contracting requirements for each of these contracts, the report 
concludes that some consolidation of resources could have been realized through better 
planning and coordination among the responsible CCOs. Regardless, it is clear that CCOs 
operate in a complex and demanding realm where service contracts, deemed simple in 
any other environment, become daunting. 
Despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, where the U.S. combat mission is 
scheduled to end in August 2010, and the current administration’s policy to begin 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011, there remains an 
enduring requirement for the DoD to facilitate contractor support so long as the U.S. 
remains committed to resolutely influencing the future of the two countries’ security, 
economy, and government institutions. CCOs will likely manage some stability and 
reconstruction programs in the two countries for several more years. These contingency 
operations are wideranging, difficult to execute, and expensive. They encompass 
infrastructure repair and construction, governance and institution building, development 
of civil society and the rule of law, and the training of local police and security forces. As 
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of March 2009, the U.S. Congress had appropriated over $80 billion for stability and 
reconstruction programs in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 ($51 billion for Iraq and $33 
billion for Afghanistan). The second FY 2009 supplemental spending bill provided $980 
million for economic development programs and for strengthening governance and rule 
of law in Afghanistan, as well as $3.6 billion to train and equip the Afghan security 
forces (Thibault, 2009). The nature of stability and reconstruction operations, during and 
immediately following combat missions, presents additional complexities for the CCO in 
today’s contingency operations. 
The combination of an escalating number of increasingly complex service 
contracts and an acquisition labor force that is ill-equipped to manage the workload due 
to its decreasing size and competency levels has severely diminished the DoD’s ability to 
facilitate contracted support to forces fighting in contingency operations. The Gansler 
Commission (Gansler et al., 2007) describes the combination as a “perfect storm” (p. 17). 
Barbaris and Callanan (2008) add that the DoD’s acquisition workforce risks falling into 
a “death spiral” (p. 17). The aggressive outsourcing of support services that began 15 
years ago is unlikely to wane, thereby intensifying the complexity of service contract 
requirements for an acquisition workforce that has only a moderate capacity to deal with 
the workload. 
4. Inadequately Trained Contingency Contracting Officers 
Throughout the U.S. military’s history, the absence of clear contingency 
contracting policies and procedures has inhibited the development of a benchmark 
training curriculum that would serve to standardize knowledge across its CCO corps. 
Luse, Madeline, Smith and Starr (2005) concluded that the training and education system 
for CCOs was in desperate need of an overhaul based on their research of 96 distinct 
overseas contingency operations, to which the U.S. deployed its forces, occurring 
between 1975 and 2005. The majority of these events indicated the need for qualified 
CCOs and contractors that could be ready to deploy on short notice. Their research 
particularly noted the following deficiencies: 
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 lack of or inconsistent Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) certification level attainments among CCOs; 
 lack of a joint CCO curriculum; 
 preclusion from enrollment because of CON 234 prerequisites for students 
who needed it most—those who were imminently deploying to a 
contingency contracting operation, or had already completed a CCO 
deployment; and 
 failure to integrate lessons learned by CCOs returning from recent 
deployments. (Luse et al., 2005) 
In 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics released a status report on the DoD’s implementation of recommendations from 
the Gansler Commission (USD [AT&L], 2008). The report indicated that there remained 
a significant gap between the level of contracting knowledge required on the ground 
versus that which could be obtained from service-specific training or from the DAU’s 
curriculum. The report also asserted that the DoD had neither initiated a standard 
contingency contracting certification program nor had it ensured that all deployed 
contracting personnel had completed CON 234. Furthermore, the lack of a standard 
baseline of contracting knowledge across the military branches created confusion among 
deployed CCOs working in joint environments. The report proposed the following 
competencies for deployed contracting personnel: 
 a joint perspective on contingency contracting; 
 practical knowledge in pre-deployment planning; 
 more hands-on practical experience in writing contingency contracts; 
 special emphasis on ethics and fraud indicators with respect to 
contingency contracting; 
 participation in military exercises (both service-specific and joint) to 
practice contingency contracting through scenario-based exercises; 
 a greater level of cultural awareness; and 
 ready access to guidance specific to contracting in support of contingency 
operations. (USD [AT&L], 2008, p. 47) 
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5. Inadequately Trained Non-Acquisition Personnel 
Although not within the scope of this research, it is worth noting that the lack of 
rudimentary contracting education for deployed non-acquisition “first-tier customers” 
(i.e., operational commanders and their non-acquisition personnel directly engaged in 
contractor oversight) has exacerbated contingency contracting management. The wars of 
the last decade have stressed the DoD’s acquisition workforce and have frequently 
necessitated the use of non-acquisition personnel who have limited experience in the 
execution of contracts in contingency environments. Similarly, senior planners and 
operational leaders deployed to the USCENTCOM theater have possessed limited 
experience in managing the large number of contractors accompanying their forces (USD 
[AT&L], 2008). 
Oversight of contracts in a contingency operation, which includes contract 
administration functions, quality assurance surveillance, corrective action, property 
administration, and past performance evaluation, ultimately rests with the CCO, who has 
the responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth in the 
contract. CCOs, however, are often not located in the areas where contracted services are 
being provided. As a result, CCOs (or the responsible contracting officers) must appoint 
non-acquisition personnel to be responsible for monitoring contractor performance. 
Called CORs, or contracting officer’s representatives, they act as the eyes and ears of the 
contracting officer and serve as the liaison between the contractor and the contracting 
officer. CORs cannot, in their duties, direct the contractor by making commitments or 
changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the 
contract (GAO, 2010). Ideally, CORs are technical subject matter experts for the 
contracted service, and in effect provide much of the day-to-day oversight of the contract. 
Yet, CORs are generally not contracting specialists so they rarely receive adequate 
formal training in contract management before assuming that role. Moreover, their 
service as CORs is often not their primary military duty. 
While inadequately trained CORs represent a significant problem in contingency 
environments, the operational commanders who rely on contracted support for their 
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warfighters have likewise been ill-equipped to engage in effective contract planning. A 
recent report concluded that leaders lacked the fundamental, but essential, contracting 
education required to determine requirements, translate them into statements of work, and 
then oversee that work (USD [AT&L], 2008). Although it is the CCO’s job to facilitate 
these milestones, the ultimate effectiveness of contracted support delivered in the 
battlefield is a function of senior leaders’ contributions during the planning phase. The 
Gansler Commission maintains that “since contractors on the battlefield are a reality for 
future expeditionary operations, leaders and operators outside the acquisition community 
must be trained on the role and importance of contracting and contractors in 
expeditionary operations” (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 47). 
6. Inadequate Resource Planning 
Several analyses assert that the DoD does not adequately plan for the use of 
contractors, lacks contingency contracting experience, and does not sufficiently 
coordinate contracts across military services (CRS, 2010b). For example, the Gansler 
Commission (Gansler et al., 2007) identified a lack of integrative planning as a 
fundamental reason that the DoD has failed to effectively and efficiently administer 
contracting actions in the austere environments where U.S. forces conduct contingency 
operations. The paucity of advance resource planning for contingency contracting 
operations still exists despite the abundance of myriad policies to the contrary. Even 
doctrine that preceded the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had little effect on improving 
integrative contract planning. For instance, PDD 56 on managing complex contingency 
operations stated that: 
Military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner 
through effective interagency management and the use of special 
mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and 
effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can 
avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in 
unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is 
essential for success of the mission. (POTUS, 1997, para. 8) 
The GAO continues to report that the DoD fails to plan for the use of contractors 
in support of ongoing contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, 
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during the GAO’s December 2009 trip to Afghanistan, they found that only limited 
planning had been done with regard to contracts or contractors. Specifically, they 
determined that, with the exception of planning for the Logistics Civil Augmentation 
Program (LOGCAP), the U.S. Army had not begun to consider the full range of 
contractor services that might be needed to support the planned increase of U.S. forces in 
that country. More important, the Army’s senior planners in Afghanistan appeared to be 
unaware of their responsibility, as defined by DoD guidance, to identify contracted 
support requirements or to develop contract management and support plans (GAO, 2010). 
D. PUBLIC LAWS AFFECTING CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
OPERATIONS 
This section indentifies several congressional enactments meant to improve the 
contingency contracting environment. Although the following list is not all-inclusive in 
regard to laws affecting the DoD’s contract management practices, these initiatives 
represent the most recent and significant laws to be passed that address the six problems 
introduced in the previous section. 
 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007, Sec. 854, 
Joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program 
management, and contingency contracting (2006). This law elevated the 
responsibility for defining contract requirements to more senior levels and 
forced the DoD to assess the efficacy of its contracting and noncontracting 
officer education system at all levels (basic, intermediate, and senior). 
 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Sec. 852, Department of 
Defense acquisition workforce development fund (2008a). This law 
established a fund to ensure that the DoD’s acquisition workforce achieves 
the capacity, in both personnel and skills, to properly perform its mission, 
oversee contractor performance, and ensure that the DoD receives the best 
value for the funds expended. 
 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, Sec. 
833, Acquisition workforce expedited hiring authority (2008b). This law 
gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to designate any category of 
acquisition positions as a shortage category in order to improve recruiting 
rates for critical acquisition workforce vacancies through September 30, 
2012. 
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 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, Sec. 
834, Career path and other requirements for military personnel in the 
acquisition field (2008b). This law increased the number of general and 
flag officer billets in the acquisition fields. 
 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, Sec. 
869, Acquisition workforce development strategic plan (2008b). This law 
authorized the preparation and completion of an actionable five-year plan 
in coordination with other federal agencies to increase the size of the 
acquisition workforce, and to operate a government-wide acquisition 
intern program. The law included the development of a sustainable 
funding model to support efforts to hire, retain, and train an acquisition 
workforce of appropriate size and skill to effectively carry out the 
acquisition programs of all federal agencies. 
 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, Sec. 
870, Contingency Contracting Corps (2008b). This law authorized the 
establishment of a government-wide Contingency Contracting Corps for 
deployment in response to an emergency or major disaster or a 
contingency operation. 
 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010, Sec. 832, Funding of 
Department of Defense acquisition workforce development fund (2009). 
This law authorized the Secretary of Defense to supplement the fund 
enacted in Sec. 852, Public Law Number 110-181, with unobligated 
balances from any appropriations for procurement, research, development, 
test and evaluation, or operation and maintenance during the 24-month 
period following the expiration of availability for those funds. 
E. DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY 
The DAU was established on August 1, 1992, in response to the DAWIA 
initiative, which called for a joint venture between the existing Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marine, and DoD acquisition training programs. One of the DAU’s primary objectives 
was to standardize training among the different DoD acquisition communities. Through 
the DAU consortium, the service-specific schools would remain separate and distinct 
institutions, but certain mandatory courses would be centrally managed through the DAU 
(Luse et al., 2005). The DAU has adapted over the years to accommodate information 
technology and the increasing demand for acquisition education by the DoD’s contracting 
workforce. For example, in an effort to expand the reach of many mandatory courses, the 
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DAU began teaching some courses at satellite facilities and delivering other modules via 
the internet. Additionally, many universities and service schools now teach acquisition 
courses that have been accredited by the DAU as “equivalency courses.” For example, 
the Florida Institute of Technology and Webster University currently offer such training 
(Luse et al., 2005). The DAU is also responsible for standardizing DAWIA certification 
levels, typically I, II, and III within a specific career path (e.g., logistics). This is a 
necessary step to ensure that the formal education of all of the DoD’s acquisition 
professionals conform to appropriate functional requirements, managerial 
responsibilities, and rank (or grade). 
Despite the broad success of the DAU’s curricula and nonresident training 
resources since its 1992 inception, including the introduction of CON 234 in 1997, 
formal instruction of practical contingency contracting knowledge remained largely 
ineffective until the Gansler Commission completed its 2007 assessment in Iraq. The 
Gansler Commission recognized that the DAU did not provide contingency contracting 
instruction for the acquisition, logistics, and contracting workforce to the same level of 
competency that it trained traditional weapons systems contracting. The Commission also 
noted that contracting professionals, particularly Army personnel, were rarely certified to 
Level I contracting proficiency before deploying to their first contingency contracting 
operation, and that the DAU should be provided the necessary resources to accommodate 
the surge of contracting professionals requiring Level I certification in response to the 
Commission’s recommendations (USD [AT&L], 2008). The Director of Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy has since promoted the development of joint 
contingency contracting proficiency levels in conjunction with the DAU with the goal of 
standardizing CCO course requirements and materials; this initiative was demonstrated 
with the 2008 publication of the Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook, the basis for 




Congress enacted the DAWIA on November 5, 1990, prompting the subsequent 
creation of the DAU. The DAWIA required the Secretary of Defense to establish an 
acquisition workforce with specific experience, education, and training qualifications. 
Provisions of this initiative required the following actions: 
(1) establish a management structure, policies, and regulations for 
implementing the act's provisions; 
(2) establish qualification requirements; and 
(3) provide training and education to meet those requirements. (GAO, 1993, 
p. 1) 
2. Contingency Contracting Officer Core Training Model 
Despite the military’s increasing reliance on contracted services in the wars of the 
21st century, the DAU did not recognize contingency contracting as a legitimate 
proficiency within the DAWIA certification process. By 2005, it was determined that 
there were approximately 18 distinct contracting and acquisition courses being taught to 
individuals who were responsible for contingency contracting operations (Luse et al., 
2005). However, since the 2007 Gansler Commission, the DAU has worked closely with 
military service representatives to standardize the required contracting courses that CCOs 
should complete. The resulting core training model, shown in Figure 7, comprises nine 
required courses and is 90% to 95% common across the DoD’s services (Calisti, 2009). 
The Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) deems that completion of the nine courses—
plus one optional course, not shown in Figure 7—qualifies an individual eligible as a 























































Figure 7.   DAU’s CCO Core Training Model (From Calisti, 2009, p. 13) 
3. CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting 
In 1997, the DAU launched CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting. The course 
was significantly updated and redeployed in late 2007 in response to the Gansler 
Commission. CON 234 was redesigned to train a journeyman-level CCO to be 
deployable worldwide and immediately effective upon arrival to support the contingency 
mission (USD [AT&L], 2008). The revised course was required to incorporate the Joint 
Contingency Contracting Handbook to the greatest extent possible. CON 234 is presently 
offered to qualified acquisition professionals as a nine-day resident course at DAU 
training facilities, approximately 20 times per year. 
4. CON 334 Advanced Contingency Contracting 
Although not included in the DAU’s CCO core training model, CON 334 
Advanced Contingency Contracting is one of the four courses that we analyzed for this 
report. The course, scheduled for launch in August 2010 as a four-day resident course, is 
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a follow-on course to CON 234 and will be offered approximately five times per year. 
This course was developed as an advanced contingency contracting course, which would 
provide just-in-time training to senior level contracting personnel deploying to contract 
management positions (USD [AT&L], 2008). 
F. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
The NPS, established in 1909, is an institution dedicated to providing relevant 
education and research to the defense and security arenas, and to recognizing and 
innovatively solving problems in support of U.S. military forces, global partners, and 
national security. The Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP), one of 
four schools at the NPS, educates U.S. and allied military officers, as well as federal 
service civilians, in defense-focused business and public policy. The GSBPP conducts 
research in defense management and public policy, and provides intellectual resources for 
leaders and organizations concerned with defense business management practices and 
policies. The GSBPP’s Acquisition and Contract Management Curricula are designed to 
develop the knowledge, skills, and competencies necessary to effectively lead the DoD’s 
acquisition workforce and efficiently manage the resources allocated to the acquisition 
process (NPS, 2010). 
In 2003, the NPS introduced MN 3318 Principles of Contingency Contracting. 
MN 3318, certified in 2004 by the DAU as an equivalent to CON 234, is a graduate level 
course of more than 30 hours delivered in resident format to NPS students (typically 
those enrolled in the school’s acquisition and contract management curricula) twice per 
year, and additionally delivered via distance learning to other acquisition professionals at 
least once per year. Two key differences between MN 3318 and CON 234 are the 
delivery approach and the target audience. MN 3318 is instructed at the graduate 
education level through the seminar method of teaching, which is based on the Socratic 
technique of encouraging students to engage in divergent problem solving instead of 
convergent rote learning. 
 57
G. EXPEDITIONARY CONTRACTING COMMAND 
In October 2008, the ECC was established as a subordinate command of the ACC. 
The ECC provides contracting support to Army and joint contingency operations, while 
the ACC, a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), 
oversees contract management for most of the Army’s procurement programs. 
1. Mission and Organizational Structure 
The mission of the ECC is to “plan and execute effective and agile contracting 
support for U.S. Army Service Component Commanders in support of Army and Joint 
operations. [The mission additionally is to] provide effective and responsive contracting 
support for OCONUS installation operations” (ECC, 2010, p. 1). Its organization’s 
command structure is illustrated in Figure 8. The ECC is composed of multiple modular 
elements that can direct contracting support to the warfighter. These elements are 
described below. 
 Contracting Support Brigades: 19 personnel each; plan for and coordinate 
all contracting functions within a theater of operation 
 Contingency Contracting Battalions: 8 personnel each; provide contracting 
support planning to deployed corps and division level maneuver forces 
 Senior Contingency Contracting Teams: 4 personnel each; provide 
contracting support to deployed brigade level maneuver forces 
 Contingency Contracting Teams: 4 personnel each; provide contracting 
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Figure 8.   ECC Command Structure FY 2011 (From ECC, 2010, p. 2) 
2. Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (51C) 
In September 2009, the ECC released a draft version of the SMCT (51C) for its 
contracting officers. The SMCT (51C) includes 36 key tasks comprising the body of 
knowledge essential for Army CCOs (51C). The manual, although still in draft format, is 
accessible to all military and civilian personnel with AKO user access. This resource is 
intended to be used as an independent study tool for all new 51Cs, but its content will be 
typically reinforced at the unit level through a mentor program whereby senior 1102s 
(federal service civilian contract specialists) guide junior 51Cs through a proficiency 
process. The SMCT’s 36 tasks are distributed over four chapters. 
 Chapter 1: Unit Engagement Tasks 
 Chapter 2: Pre Award Tasks 
 Chapter 3: Post-award Tasks 
 Chapter 4: Other CCO Tasks (ECC, 2009) 
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H. THE YODER THREE-TIER MODEL 
In December 2004, Professor E. Cory Yoder published a working paper at the 
NPS, “The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency 
Contracting,” which introduced a credential-based hierarchical tool that can assist the 
mission planner in maximizing effectiveness and efficiency of contingency contracting 
operations. The personnel structure model is a conceptual framework that aligns theater-
wide contracting support with a COCOM’s operational objectives through integrative 
planning and execution. Specifically, the model improves a planning staff’s ability to 
determine the level of contracting resources needed to support a contingency operation by 
identifying the optimal combination of capabilities and expertise needed by a theater-
wide corps of CCOs to accomplish the COCOM’s mission. The tool can, and should, be 
applied throughout all phases of a contingency operation, including during the 
development of CSIPs, which align with OPLANs and OPORDs (Yoder, 2004). 
Yoder created the YTTM to directly benefit COCOMs, J-4/J-5 staffs, senior 
planners and NGOs/PVOs. He proposed the YTTM as an approach to accomplish the 
following goals: 
 support theater contingency contracting objectives effectively and 
efficiently; remove formatting  
 guide the education of military and civilian personnel in support of 
contingency contracting operations; 
 integrate effective planning of functional resources, training requirements, 
proficiency levels, and administrative support elements for a contingency 
contracting organization; and 
 provide contingency contracting commands a tool to identify areas of 
structural deficiency within its acquisition organization prior to 
deployment to a contingency environment. (Yoder, 2004) 
The YTTM partitions the employment of CCOs into three “tier levels” which 




education and experience a CCO accumulates over the course of his or her career. Each 
tier is codependent, or integrated in a hierarchical manner, with respect to the other tiers 
(Yoder, 2004). The tier levels are: 
1. Tier One—Ordering Officer (OO); 
2. Tier Two—Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO); and 
3. Tier Three—Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE). 
Furthermore, each tier level of the YTTM is defined by four elements. The 
elements are: 
1. functional requirements; 
2. education level; 
3. skill sets; and 
4. personnel and manpower characteristics. (Yoder, 2004) 
Table 4 summarizes the YTTM. Note that the table also includes a section called 




Table 4.   Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations (From 
Yoder, 2004, p. 17) 
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1. Ordering Officer 
The ordering officer (OO) provides the most rudimentary level of contracting 
support, which includes functions such as placing simple buys against existing theater 
contracts. By nature, this position requires little interactive engagement in the 
environment (Yoder, 2004). The OO conducts simplified acquisitions of relatively small 
dollar amounts. The OO typically has no broad liaison functions, nor is he or she engaged 
in operational planning. Ideally, the OO should have completed the DAU’s CON 234 and 
be DAWIA CON level I or II certified. The OO is typically a junior to mid-grade enlisted 
military service member, junior officer, or a federal service civilian contract specialist of 
equivalent paygrade. 
2. Leveraging Contracting Officer 
The leveraging contracting officer (LCO) performs the basic ordering functions of 
the OO, but also leverages the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional 
economies in the contingent theater. This practitioner interfaces with local and regional 
businesses, creates business processes, and may coordinate with higher military echelons, 
NGOs, and PVOs (Yoder, 2004). However, the LCO typically does not have a broad 
liaison responsibility, which is an impediment that minimizes theater integration. The 
LCO provides a link between the senior planners and the customers and, therefore, is 
charged with ensuring that every facet of the contingency contracting operation complies 
with regulations and policies. This individual also executes contracting actions driven by 
the CSIP and provides flexible capabilities to support the operational commanders. The 
LCO should have completed CON 234 (and preferably other intermediate and advanced 








senior enlisted military service member, a junior to mid-grade officer, or a federal service 
civilian contract specialist of equivalent paygrade. Often the LCO is a warranted 
contracting officer.6 
3. Integrated Planner and Executor 
These well-educated and experienced CCOs are integrated into the operational 
planning phases of contingency operations, often before actual troop deployment. 
Subsequently, they make the transition to operations. The integrated planner and executor 
(IPE) plans and then executes strategic and theater objectives, exploiting all joint and 
multiagency assets available. This integrative approach minimizes the competing, and 
often conflicting, demands of the participants, aligns acquisition support with strategic 
objectives, promotes the creation of robust CSIPs, and integrates such plans into broader 
operational plans in support of theater operations (Yoder, 2004). The IPE, as the link 
between the COCOM and the CSIP, has broad liaison responsibilities, including planning 
and coordinating with NGOs and PVOs. The IPE must ensure that all contracting actions 
are planned and executed with the best approach to support the mission. Additionally, the 
IPE provides guidance to OOs and LCOs within his or her purview. The IPE should have 
a Master’s degree or higher, should have completed Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) Phase I and II, and should be DAWIA CON level III certified. The LCO is 
typically a senior officer (O-6+), a senior federal service civilian (GS-13+), or a Senior 
Executive Service (SES) civilian. 
I. OTHER TRAINING RESOURCES 
Other training resources are available that can either introduce or reinforce 
contingency contracting knowledge to the acquisition professional. However, these 
resources were not considered in our course analyses because the material was either 
                                                 
6 Warranted contracting officers may execute contracts only up to the amount for which they are 
warranted; applicable to the whole contract value (inclusive of all options). Contracting officer warrants 
expressly state dollar thresholds up to which the warranted contracting officer may sign on behalf of the 
government. 
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already incorporated into one of the four courses that we analyzed or it was not deemed 
credible or sufficiently mature to deliver practical and consistent knowledge to the CCO. 
1. Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook 
The Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook provides convenient tools, 
templates, and training material for the CCO in a compact and rugged cargopocket 
booklet. The handbook, which serves as the foundation for the DAU’s CON 234, also 
contains resources for contracting officers to ensure uniform contracting practices, 
including standardized contract forms and language for terms and conditions. The 
responsible publisher, DPAP, expects to update it annually with the latest version being 
released in July 2010 (GAO, 2010). The handbook is posted on the internet as a Web 
resource and contains email addresses and telephone numbers of the DAU instructors 
who can provide reach-back contingency contracting advice (Thibault, 2009). 
2. Army Contingency Contracting Handbook 
Published in September 2006, the 34-page Army Contingency Contracting 
Handbook focuses on fundamental simplified acquisition procedures and formal 
acquisition procedures. While its content is succinct and mostly relevant with respect to 
its treatment of standard contract forms, the handbook provides little planning and 
execution guidance for the deployed CCO and it does not consider statutory regulations 
that take effect during declared contingency operations. The handbook has not been 
updated since its 2006 publication. We observed that its most relevant information is 
already included in the SMCT (51C). 
3. Databases 
Databases of actual CCO purchases may be available in some cases, which could 
supplement classroom and pre-deployment training by providing insights into current 
contingency contracting operations. This information would be useful if it was tailored to 
the specific locations where CCOs were deploying, so that they could become familiar 
with their future contracting environment, including the types of purchases made, the 
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predominant types of contracts used for these purchases, and the local supply base 
(RAND, 2008). Similar contracting data for other military branches and coalition partners 
could also be used to better prepare CCOs who will be operating in joint environments. 
This data may be useful; however, its availability is unpredictable and its completeness is 
unreliable. 
4. Training Simulations and Exercises 
Training commands can develop realistic contingency contracting scenarios to 
augment current contingency contracting training following a case study format. For 
example, pre-deployment courses held at the Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training 
Center and at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Central Indiana familiarize 
civilian 1102s with everything from local supply bases to cultural sensitivities. Personnel 
take part in simulations in which they deal with outside vendors so they know what to 
expect when they're deployed. The DoD’s Director of Readiness and Training Policy and 
Programs observed, "They had to work with an interpreter; they had to take bids from 
three Afghan people that were going to provide gravel to the base; and then they had to 
work through some of the issues of a translator, understanding the bids, proposals and 
also some of the cultural issues" (Wilson, 2010, para. 9).  
The DoD Evaluation and Implementation of Recommendations from the 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations also suggest developing joint contingency gaming simulations, creating a 
video library of contingency contracting topics, and developing a multi-day joint 
contingency immersion experience (USD [AT&L], 2008). Though these events are 
presumably useful, we disregarded the analysis of these learning opportunities in our 
study because they are not generally incorporated in the DAWIA curricula or in the 
service-specific training doctrine. 
5. Temporary Duty and Interviews 
Finally, in-depth, hands-on training for CCOs may be achieved through a 
temporary duty (TDY) assignment to an ongoing contingency operation. Although it may 
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be difficult to send a CCO on TDY during the pre-deployment phase, the opportunity 
might be more pragmatic and valuable if the TDY is planned early in the unit’s homeport 
training cycle. A CCO might also gain valuable knowledge by conducting interviews 
with experienced contingency contracting officers who are currently deployed or have 
recently returned from contingency contracting operations (Coombs, 2002). However, we 
did not include these independent learning resources in the study because the 
methodology required to measure their effectiveness is beyond this report’s scope of 
research. 
J. SUMMARY 
Chapter II provided a brief history of contingency contracting operations and 
described how contracted support services have evolved throughout the major conflicts in 
which the U.S. military has participated. This chapter also examined the modern 
contingency contracting environment and the statutory provisions that regulate it. We 
identified doctrinal contingency contracting definitions, types of contingency operations, 
joint operational phases, regulatory language in the FAR, and legislative reforms. Chapter 
II additionally described prevailing challenges in the DoD’s acquisition workforce, 
contingency contracting workload, education system for CCOs and non-acquisition 
leaders, and resource planning. This chapter also introduced the three institutions that 
administer the four courses analyzed in the research and presented the elements of the 
YTTM. Finally, Chapter II discussed some other educational resources that are available 
to CCOs. 
Chapter III, Course Review, presents course content for CON 234, CON 334, MN 
3318, and the SMCT. We examine the primary and supporting learning objectives for 
each course and delineate them for further analysis in Chapter IV, Course Analysis. 
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III. COURSE REVIEW 
This chapter discusses course content for CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the 
SMCT (51C). The course content is detailed in Appendices A through E. We identified 
the primary and supporting learning objectives for each course for further analysis in 
Chapter IV, Course Analysis. Specifically, we identified each course’s primary learning 
objectives, defined them, and subsequently listed the supporting learning objectives that 
comprise each primary learning objective. This task was necessary in order to facilitate 
course analysis using the YTTM. 
Each course uses unique nomenclature to identify its learning objectives. CON 
234 and CON 334 use the terms terminal learning objectives and enabling learning 
objectives to identify their learning objectives, whereas MN 3318 uses topics and 
supporting topics, and the SMCT uses tasks and supporting tasks. Since the academic 
structure of learning objectives, or “end states,” between the four courses are 
hierarchically analogous, we commonly use the terms primary learning objectives and 
supporting learning objectives throughout the research. As such, CON 234 includes nine 
primary and 33 supporting learning objectives, CON 334 includes seven primary and 21 
supporting learning objectives, MN 3318 includes 10 primary and 50 supporting learning 
objectives, and the SMCT includes 36 primary and 188 supporting learning objectives. 
A. CON 234 JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
The DAU launched CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting in 1997. The course 
was significantly updated and redeployed in late 2007 in response to the Gansler 
Commission. CON 234 was redesigned to train a journeyman-level CCO to be 
deployable worldwide and immediately effective upon arrival to support the contingency 
mission (USD [AT&L], 2008). The course is currently designed to prepare acquisition 
professionals—typically enlisted personnel (E-5+), federal service civilians (GS-9+), and 
junior officers (O-2 to O-4)—for an initial deployment to a contingency contracting 
operation. This course includes topics on the practical application of contracting 
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processes in a contingency environment, assessing customer requirements, support 
planning, and ethics in contracting (DAU, 2010a). 
CON 234 is offered as a nine-day, 71-hour resident course at the DAU training 
facilities approximately 20 times per year. CON 234 includes nine primary learning 
objectives (called terminal learning objectives) and 33 supporting learning objectives 
(called enabling learning objectives) (DAU, 2010b). The course content for CON 234 is 
identified in Appendix A. 
B. CON 334 ADVANCED CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
CON 334 Advanced Contingency Contracting was developed as an advanced 
contingency contracting course which can provide just-in-time training to senior level 
contracting personnel deploying to contract management positions (USD [AT&L], 2008). 
This course is currently designed to provide senior acquisition professionals with the 
requisite knowledge for coordinating theater contracting resources, improving source 
selection procedures, managing contract resolutions, and developing ethical integrity 
(DAU, 2010c). 
This course, scheduled for launch in August 2010 as a four-day, 28-hour resident 
course, is a follow-on course to CON 234 and will be offered approximately five times 
per year. Additionally, there is approximately 20 hours of prerequisite coursework 
required before the course begins. CON 334 includes seven primary learning objectives 
(called terminal learning objectives) and 21 supporting learning objectives (called 
enabling learning objectives) (DAU, CON 2010d). The course content for CON 334 is 
identified in Appendix B. 
C. MN 3318 PRINCIPLES OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
MN 3318 Principles of Contingency Contracting, certified in 2004 by the DAU as 
an equivalent to CON 234, is a graduate level course of more than 30 hours delivered in 
resident format to NPS students (typically those enrolled in the school’s acquisition and 
contract management curricula) twice per year, and additionally via distance learning to 
other acquisition professionals at least once per year. Two key differences between MN 
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3318 and CON 234 are the delivery approach and the target audience. MN 3318 is 
instructed at the graduate education level through the seminar method of teaching, which 
is based on the Socratic technique of encouraging students to engage in divergent 
problem solving instead of convergent rote learning. As such, the course leverages the 
students’ backgrounds through relevant experiential discussions and sharing through 
lessons learned. The following is an excerpt from the 2010 summer quarter MN 3318 
course syllabus: 
This course is a study of the principles of contingency contracting and the 
fundamental skills required to provide direct contracting support to joint 
tactical and operational forces participating in the full spectrum of armed 
conflict and military operations other than war, both domestic and 
overseas. (Yoder, 2010, p. 1) 
MN 3318 is designed to enable mid-grade military officers (O-3 to O-5) and 
federal service civilian 1102s to assume positions of greater responsibility within the 
contingency contracting field. This course focuses on deliberate and crisis action 
planning, coordinating with staff elements in a joint planning environment, and 
synchronizing contract actions with OPLANs and OPORDs. MN 3318 includes a 
systematic approach based on five functional phases: shaping, mobilization, build-up, 
sustainment, and redeployment. 
MN 3318 includes 10 primary learning objectives (called topics) and 50 
supporting learning objectives (called supporting topics). This section presents the course 
content through (1) identification of primary and supporting learning objectives, and (2) 
typical weekly sessions in accordance with the course syllabus. The course content for 
MN 3318 is identified in Appendix C. 
MN 3318 gives instruction on the above topics via 10 weekly sessions. The 
sessions are additionally augmented by required readings and course preparation that 
takes place outside of the 30-hour resident instructional format. A typical session requires 
between five and 10 hours of student preparation before the session begins. Appendix D 
shows a sample schedule from the 2010 summer quarter MN 3318 course syllabus. The 
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designated readings and assignments reported in Appendix D are not all-inclusive, and 
specific page numbers and reference citations are not indicated. 
D. SOLDIER’S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS (51C) 
The SMCT (51C), released in September 2009 in draft format, includes 36 key 
tasks comprising the body of knowledge essential for Army CCOs (51C). Although still 
in draft format, this manual is accessible to all military and civilian personnel with AKO 
user access. This resource is intended to be used as an independent study tool for all new 
51Cs, but its content is typically reinforced at the unit level through a mentor program 
whereby senior 1102s guide junior 51Cs through a proficiency process. The development 
of the SMCT (51C) marks a significant event because prior to its release there was no 
standard Army training manual that focused exclusively on contingency contracting. The 
SMCT includes 36 primary learning objectives (called tasks) and 188 supporting learning 
objectives (called supporting tasks). The content for the draft SMCT (51C) is identified in 
Appendix E. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the course content for CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318 and 
the SMCT (51C). The course content is detailed in Appendices A through E. We 
identified the primary and supporting learning objectives for each course for further 
analysis in Chapter IV, Course Analysis. Specifically, we identified each course’s 
primary learning objectives, defined them, and subsequently listed the supporting 
learning objectives that comprise each primary learning objective. This task was 
necessary in order to facilitate the subsequent course analysis using the YTTM. 
In Chapter IV, we will conduct a comparative analysis of the primary and 
supporting learning objectives for each of the four courses. The analysis will incorporate 
the use of a quantitative rating scheme that is based on the YTTM’s four defining 
elements: function, education, skill set, and personnel and manpower attributes. We will 
then examine the relative similarities and differences between the four courses, the extent 
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to which each course benefits CCOs of varying targeted levels of proficiency, and 
whether the intent of each course is met in relation to its course description and targeted 
audience. 
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IV. COURSE ANALYSIS 
We conducted a comparative analysis of the primary and supporting learning 
objectives identified in Chapter III. Accordingly, three factors were examined for CON 
234, CON 334, MN 3318, and the SMCT: the relative similarities and differences 
between the four courses, the extent to which each course benefits CCOs of varying 
targeted levels of proficiency, and whether the intent of each course is met in relation to 
its course description and targeted audience. The analysis incorporates the use of a 
benchmark hierarchical model, the YTTM. The YTTM’s intended purpose is to 
effectively link theater contracting requirements to the skill sets of a supporting CCO 
workforce. However, by altering its intended application, the model’s flexibility also 
yields a tool that can be used to conduct a comparative analysis between contingency 
contracting courses through an examination of their respective learning objectives. 
A. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
We categorized curricular learning objectives across the YTTM hierarchy and 
differentiated the four courses by applying a quantitative rating scheme to the model. 
This quantitative rating scheme represents the YTTM’s hierarchical nature with respect 
to its four defining elements: function, education, skill set, and personnel and manpower 
attributes. The supporting learning objectives for each course were assigned numerical 
values. The average value of supporting learning objectives comprising each primary 
learning objective was computed. Next, we assigned each primary learning objective to 
one of four tier levels, which is a modification to the original YTTM that allows a 
primary learning objective to “straddle” more than one tier level of the YTTM. Each 
course was then positioned along the modified model according to the composite ratings 
of its primary learning objectives. The analysis methodology is described in greater detail 
below. 
As previously recognized in Chapter III, each course uses unique nomenclature to 
identify its learning objectives. Since the academic structure of learning objectives, or 
“end states,” between the four courses are hierarchically analogous, we used the terms 
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primary learning objectives and supporting learning objectives, where appropriate, 
throughout the course analysis. Employing this normalization of terms to the content 
extracted from the course review in Chapter III, we applied the YTTM’s tier level criteria 
to each supporting learning objective. 
The three members of our research team individually rated each supporting 
learning objective through the YTTM’s “lens” by assigning a whole number from 1 to 5 
that most accurately represents the YTTM attributes of the learning objective with respect 
to function, education, skill sets, and personnel and manpower characteristics (see Table 
5). The YTTM descriptors in Table 4 (Chapter II), including those in the Highlights and 
Drawbacks column, were utilized for the analysis. It was anticipated during the 
development of the research methodology that the learning objectives would often 
straddle tier levels of the original YTTM. Accordingly, we developed a rating scheme 
that considers the fact that learning objectives will regularly include significant 
contributions from two adjacent YTTM tier levels; such learning objectives were 
assigned the whole numbers 2 or 4, as applicable. For example, a supporting learning 
objective that, as perceived by a rater, entailed a basic task that can be completed by an 
OO, but which might require the warranted signature of a LCO, would be assigned a 2. 
Conversely, a multi-faceted supporting learning objective that may be considerably 
weighted towards the OO, even if there is a minor LCO attribute, would be assigned a 1. 
We recognize that this rating process is susceptible to subjectivity; however, measures 
were introduced to reduce misinterpretation of learning objective descriptions and their 
implied instructional purposes. These measures are described below. 
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Our research team consisted of three members, each possessing varying 
educational and experience levels in the contracting and acquisition field. Two of the 
members were Army officers enrolled full-time in the NPS’s acquisition and contracting 
curricula, which includes MN 3318, and were nearing completion of Master’s degrees in 
the Business Administration program. However, neither of these officers had yet 
completed military tours of duty as acquisition professionals. The third member of the 
research team, a Navy Civil Engineer Corps Officer certified at DAWIA CON level II, 
had moderate contracting experience, including management of overseas MILCON and 
expeditionary contracting operations in Iraq, but he was neither enrolled in the NPS’s 
acquisition track nor had he completed a CON 234 equivalency. As such, we presumed 
that subjectivity and differences between individual interpretations would be inherent in 
the rating process. Accordingly, we employed two provisions to reduce subjectivity 
resulting from rater bias. 
1. We calculated a single average for each primary learning objective from 
the individual ratings of all supporting learning objectives that comprise 
each particular primary learning objective, thereby normalizing our 
interpretations. 
2. We nominally expanded the YTTM to four tier levels that uniquely 
accommodate each primary learning objective (by its computed average) 
in order to provide a greater degree of flexibility for “positioning” the 
primary learning objectives on the YTTM, and for presenting the results. 
Table 6 illustrates an example of a rating scheme for one primary learning 
objective: the SMCT’s Task 1-1, Identify Supported Units. In this case, there are four 
supporting learning objectives (called supporting tasks in the SMCT’s vernacular) that 
comprised Task 1-1. The three members of our research team, R1, R2, and R3, 
individually rated each supporting task in accordance with the YTTM’s criteria 
previously delineated in Table 4 (Chapter II) and the five-point rating scale described by 
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Table 5. A composite average was calculated by dividing the total rating sum by the 
number of rating actions. Note that we did not incorporate weighted averages into the 
analysis. The inclusion of weighted averages would have exacerbated the subjectivity of 
the results because we were unable to ascertain the supporting learning objectives’ 
relative duration of instruction within each course and their ultimate bearing on the 
primary learning objectives’ practical application in an authentic contingency 
environment. Table 6 is an example of the rating process, which also includes a narrative 
justification summarizing key arguments from all three raters. 
Table 6.   Rating Example 
RATING Justification 
Task 1-1 
Identify Supported Units 
R1 R2 R3 
Receive tasking to provide 
contracting support 1 1 1 3 
Identify critical unit attributes 1 2 1 4 
Identify support units’ battle 
rhythm and processes 1 2 1 4 
Identify key contracting-related 
processes and procedures 2 1 2 5 
Total 16 
Composite Average,  1.33 
Junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers, GS-7 to 
GS-9-1102 series civilians 
 
CCO can complete this task with DAU CON 234 
or below 
 
No operational planning and little integration 
required 
 




We recognized that by using this quantitative approach, a sorting mechanism 
would be required to position the primary learning objectives across the YTTM. As 
previously discussed, we anticipated that learning objectives would often span two tier 
levels of the original YTTM. Consequently, we developed a grading system that modified 
the YTTM from three to four tier levels in order to provide a greater degree of flexibility 
for positioning the primary learning objectives on the YTTM. The sorting mechanism is 
illustrated in Table 7. Each tier level description shown in Table 7 is derived from the 
YTTM and does not influence the initial ratings demonstrated in Table 6. This grading 
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system, combined with the quantitative normalization of primary learning objectives 
between the three raters, reduced the effects of subjectivity inherent to this analysis. 
After calculating the composite average for a particular primary learning 
objective, we assigned it to a tier level in accordance with Table 7. For example, the 
SMCT Task 1-1 in Table 6 was assigned to tier level 1-2 because its computed average 
was 1.33 (between 1.00 and 2.00). By definition of the sorting mechanism presented in 
Table 7, a primary learning objective can only be assigned to one of the four tier levels 
and no primary learning objective can span more or less than two categories of the five-
point rating scale introduced in Table 5. 
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Table 7.   Modified YTTM Tier Levels 
Composite Average Description Tier Level 
1.00 – 2.00 Intern: minimal training required; individual is beginning to build 
a rudimentary acquisition knowledge base but generally is not yet 
DAWIA certified; able to perform simple administrative 
contracting actions; developing fundamental OO skill sets; 
requires extensive supervision and mentoring 
1-2 
2.01 – 3.00 Apprentice: junior practitioner certified at DAWIA level I or 
higher; acquisition knowledge base and OO skill sets are mature or 
maturing; executes simplified acquisitions regularly; has 
satisfactory understanding of the FAR; may be a warranted 
contracting officer; has completed at least one CCO deployment 
2-3 
3.01 – 4.00 Journeyman: warranted contracting officer certified at DAWIA 
level II or higher; able to plan and execute contracting solutions 
for the operational commander; leverages the local economy; 
understands the significance of integrative theater planning and 
execution; well-developed acquisition knowledge base and CCO 
experience; thorough understanding of the FAR and DoD 
acquisition policies; able to effectively contribute input to senior 
planners; mentors OOs 
3-4 
4.01 – 5.00 Master: mature LCO skill set or advanced acquisition planning 
experience; well-developed acquisition knowledge base; regularly 
contributes to (or is member of) theater COCOM staff; education 
includes advanced degree(s) and joint military professional 
training; DAWIA level III certified; able to articulate OPLAN and 
OPORD requirements; supports national security objectives 
through CSIP contributions 
4-5 
 
B. RESULTS BY COURSE 
This section reports our analysis results for the four courses. The results are 
presented by course in matrices that visually display the tier level to which each primary 
learning objective was assigned on the modified YTTM. Additionally, the matrices report 
the total number of “hits” in each category of our five-point scale; these are indicated 
along with their respective percentages of the total number of hits for each course. From 
these data, a histogram was created for each course to demonstrate the relative 
distribution of primary learning objectives across the four-tier model and, by extension, 
the original YTTM. This section also provides a brief explanation for each supporting 
learning objective’s rating. 
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1. CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting 
The DAU launched CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting in 1997. The course 
was significantly updated and redeployed in late 2007 in response to the Gansler 
Commission (Gansler et al., 2007). CON 234 was redesigned to train a journeyman-level 
CCO to be deployable worldwide and immediately effective upon arrival to support the 
contingency mission (USD [AT&L], 2008). CON 234 is presently offered to qualified 
acquisition professionals as a nine-day resident course at the DAU training facilities 
approximately 20 times per year. CON 234 includes nine primary learning objectives, 
called TLOs, and 33 supporting learning objectives, called ELOs. The CON 234 analysis 
is reported in Table 8. 
Table 8.   CON 234 Matrix 
OO LCO IPE
1 2 3 4 5
TLO 1 Explain the elements of contingency 
contracting planning
TLO 2 Recognize the importance of ethical 
behavior in a contracting environment
TLO 3 Explain roles and responsibilities in a 
contingency contracting environment
TLO 4 Explain the impact of cross-cultural 
behavior patterns, anti-terrorism vulnerabilities, 
and OPSEC in a contingency contracting 
environment
TLO 5 Verify that a purchase request document is 
properly document and certified
TLO 6 Complete the appropriate contract actions 
based on a given scenario
TLO 7 Outline a course of action for a disaster or 
emergency response scenario
TLO 8 Perform contract administration actions 
required for a contingency contracting scenario
TLO 9 Discuss actions a contracting officer should 
take when completing a contract claim, protest , 
and/or dispute




 TLO 1 requires some unit-level planning to be conducted during pre-
deployment and it requires integration with other combat support agencies. 
TLO 1 also requires the ability to analyze theater support organizations 
and assess capabilities. These tasks are consistent with those CCOs found 
at the LCO level requiring some operational planning and facilitating 
integration with operational commanders. 
 TLO 2 requires CCOs to conduct themselves ethically in foreign 
environments (i.e., generally those LCOs or IPEs coordinating with local 
national citizens). However, all CCOs are expected to be able to ascertain 
ethical resources. 
 TLO 3 requires fundamental recognition of roles and responsibilities for 
CCOs. All CCOs should be capable of defining basic elements of the 
contingency contracting environment. 
 TLO 4 requires the ability to differentiate between foreign acquisition 
solutions based on an understanding of cultural differences. This is 
commensurate with a CCO serving at the LCO level, where he or she is 
expected to conduct local operational planning and integrate all available 
resources accordingly. Additionally, the CCO should be prepared to 
initiate appropriate OPSEC measures as needed. 
 TLO 5 requires a satisfactory understanding of the acquisition process and 
some knowledge of defense appropriations and lines of accounting. An 
understanding of the contract review board process and the contract 
ratification process is also required. A CCO at the LCO level is 
appropriate for this requirement. 
 TLO 6 requires differentiating between the types of contingencies, 
contract types, and dollar thresholds. This task may require more 
experience and expertise than that found at the OO level. 
 TLO 7 requires an intricate understanding of the various agencies within 
the U.S. government that are responsible for disaster relief and 
humanitarian missions. Additionally, the CCO must be experienced with 
advance planning and have the ability to recognize potential deficiencies 
prior to execution. A CCO at the IPE level would be most qualified for 
this level but a mature LCO would also possess the right skill set. 
 TLO 8 requires a thorough understanding of purchase orders. The task 
entails experience with post-award contract actions, COR duties, contract 
termination, and closeout procedures in a contingency environment. 
 TLO 9 requires an understanding of claims, protests, and dispute 
processes. Additionally, the CCO is expected to have experience in 
 81
mitigating the risks of these contracting events. A CCO serving at the 
LCO level would have the experience to both reduce the likelihood of 
such an occurrence and react appropriately. 
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the nine primary learning objectives for 
CON 234, which appears to be symmetric about tier level 2-3. The analysis reports that 
seven of the nine primary learning objectives are tier level 2-3, while tier levels 1-2 and 
3-4 each comprise one learning objective. On the basis of our five-point rating scale, 
categories 2 and 3 received 88.8% of the hits. Therefore, CON 234 neither emphasizes its 
course content on the inexperienced OO, nor on the vastly experienced senior LCO. The 
research suggests that CON 234’s target audience should be the junior practitioner 
certified at DAWIA level I or higher who has acquired an intermediate acquisition 




















Figure 9.   CON 234 Histogram 
2. CON 334 Advanced Contingency Contracting 
CON 334 Advanced Contingency Contracting was developed as an advanced 
contingency contracting course which would provide just-in-time training to senior level 
contracting personnel deploying to contract management positions (USD [AT&L], 2008). 
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This course, scheduled for launch in August 2010 as a four-day resident course, is a 
follow-on course to CON 234 and will be offered approximately five times per year. 
CON 334 includes seven primary learning objectives, called TLOs, and 21 supporting 
learning objectives, called ELOs. The CON 334 analysis is reported in Table 9. 
Table 9.   CON 334 Matrix 
OO LCO IPE
1 2 3 4 5
TLO 1 Recognize and defend the most appropriate 
approaches for a contingency CoCo in an AOR 
throughout the four phases of a contingency
TLO 2 Recommend contract support for the 
warfighter in any given situation
TLO 3 Justify the appropriate ethical contingency 
contracting approach in an AOR contingency
TLO 4 Select the most appropriate resource for the 
most efficient and effective contingency office 
operation during all phases of a contingency
TLO 5 Determine the appropriate contractual 
resolution for a contingency AOR requirement
TLO 6 Apply the necessary steps in the source 
selection process given the need to select a best  
value solution
TLO 7 Select the most appropriate resource for the 
most efficient and effective contingency office 
operation during all phases of contingency
Summary 0 (0%) 1 (7.1%) 1 (7.1%) 6 (42.9%) 6 (42.9%)  
 TLO 1 requires the CCO to directly support the COCOM during all four 
phases of a contingency operation, which is the basis for an individual 
serving at the IPE level. This CCO also must provide direct planning 
support to the OPLAN, OPORD, and related national security strategies. 
 TLO 2 requires an understanding of the CSIP and the ability to develop 
solutions guided by its doctrine. The CCO must possess the ability to 
anticipate issues not directly addressed in the CSIP. These joint planning 
qualities are commensurate with a CCO serving at the IPE level. 
 TLO 3 requires an advanced understanding of acquisition regulations 
(USC and the FAR) and ethical conduct. CCOs serving at the IPE level 
have the experience required to identify the most ethical approach in 
complex contingency contracting situations. 
 TLO 4 requires the ability to evaluate the requirements for a CSIP. This 
quality is commensurate with a CCO serving at the IPE level who would 
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be integrated into the highest level of joint planning and serves as the 
acquisition component between the COCOM and the OPLAN. 
 TLO 5 requires a thorough understanding of the JARB processes. The 
CCO must be able to analyze and validate requirement packages for the 
JARB. This CCO must also be prepared to serve as a member of the 
JARB. 
 TLO 6 requires a thorough understanding of the source selection process, 
the ability to prepare instructions to offerors, and experience evaluating 
factors for best-value source selection. CCOs serving at the LCO level are 
involved in these processes on a regular basis. 
 TLO 7 requires the ability to evaluate redeployment plans and determine 
the efficacy of multiple acquisition strategies from a theater planning 
perspective. This CCO must be prepared to participate at the highest levels 
of military planning and acquisition strategy integration. 
Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of the seven primary learning objectives for 
CON 334, which is weighted toward tier level 4-5. The analysis reports that six of the 
seven primary learning objectives are tier level 4-5, whereas one primary learning 
objective is at tier level 2-3. On the basis of the rating scale, categories 4 and 5 received 
85.8% of the hits. Therefore, CON 334 does not emphasize its course content on the 
inexperienced LCO or below. The research suggests that CON 334’s target audience 
should be the mature LCO or an advanced acquisition planner who must regularly 
contribute to (or is a member of) a theater COCOM staff. The individual should have 
completed advanced education, including joint military professional training, and he or 
she typically should be certified at DAWIA level III. He or she should also be able to 


















Figure 10.   CON 334 Histogram 
3. MN 3318 Principles of Contingency Contracting 
MN 3318 Principles of Contingency Contracting, certified in 2004 by the DAU as 
an equivalent to CON 234, is a graduate level course of more than 30 hours delivered in 
resident format to NPS students (typically those enrolled in the school’s acquisition and 
contract management curricula) twice per year, and additionally via distance learning to 
other acquisition professionals at least once per year. Two key differences between MN 
3318 and CON 234 are the delivery approach and the target audience. MN 3318 is 
instructed at the graduate education level through the seminar method of teaching, which 
is based on the Socratic technique of encouraging students to engage in divergent 
problem solving instead of convergent rote learning. MN 3318 includes 10 primary 
learning objectives, called topics and 50 supporting learning objectives called supporting 
topics. The MN 3318 analysis is reported in Table 10. 
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Table 10.   MN 3318 Matrix 
OO LCO IPE
1 2 3 4 5
Topic 1 Types of Contingencies
Topic 2 Cross-Cultural Awareness
Topic 3 Roles and Responsibilit ies
Topic 4 Automated Tools
Topic 5 Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning
Topic 6 Anti-Terrorism and Security
Topic 7 Funding of Contingency Operations
Topic 8 Administration, Termination, and Closeout 
of Contingency Contracts
Topic 9 Case Studies and Integrating Concepts
Topic 10 Ethical Business Conduct
Summary 0 (0%) 2 (10%) 5 (25%) 8 (40%) 5 (25%)  
 Topic 1 requires a moderate ability to identify contracting sources 
throughout all phases of support. The CCO must have sufficient 
experience to discuss waivers, deviations, and other expedited contracting 
procedures. A CCO at the basic OO level would lack the expertise to meet 
these requirements. 
 Topic 2 requires an understanding of cross-cultural behaviors and the 
ability to communicate at high levels with foreign governments and 
businesses. The CCO must have mature cultural awareness and be able to 
coordinate theater objectives into contracting support. 
 Topic 3 requires joint task force experience and experience with the 
contracting processes of the JARB. The CCO needs to understand the 
roles and responsibilities of joint task force operations and interagency 
coordination. 
 Topic 4 requires the ability to develop and implement contract actions 
given an array of resource levels. A CCO serving at the OO level would 
not be expected to execute these complex administrative actions. 
 Topic 5 requires an understanding of the JULLS and the CSIP. The CCO 
would be expected to effectively participate in joint operational planning. 
 Topic 6 requires mastery of integrating anti-terrorism practices into all 
applicable contingency contracting operations. 
 Topic 7 requires a thorough understanding of congressional 
appropriations. A CCO serving at the OO level would generally lack the 
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knowledge to identify types of appropriations and practical understanding 
of all fiscal regulations. 
 Topic 8 requires an understanding of the claims process, types of contract 
modifications, and the procedures for ratifying UCs. Generally, the ability 
to properly conduct administrative and termination actions is expected at 
the LCO and IPE levels. 
 Topic 9 requires the CCO to prepare a LOGCAP case exercise. This 
exercise requires a broad understanding of contracting concepts, spanning 
simple buys to developing a CSIP. The CCO must be able to support 
theater objectives with well-crafted contracting strategies. 
 Topic 10 requires extensive experience and education with respect to 
ethics, ethical dilemmas, fiscal law, and advance planning at the theater 
level. 
Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of the 10 primary learning objectives for MN 
3318, which is predominantly concentrated on number 4 of the scale. The analysis reports 
that five of the 10 primary learning objectives are tier level 4-5, three are tier level 3-4, 
and the remaining two are tier level 2-3. On the basis of the rating scale, category 4 
received 40% of the hits, categories 3 and 5 each received 25%, and category 2 received 
10%. Therefore, MN 3318 does not emphasize its course content on the individual 
operating below an LCO level. The research suggests that MN 3318’s target audience 
should be the well-developed LCO, although course content for beginning LCOs and 
advanced acquisition planners are also well represented. MN 3318 is a course tailored 
toward the higher end of the YTTM scale, although its content is broad enough to benefit 
individuals at the apprentice to master tier levels in accordance with Table 7. It is 
superior to CON 234 in the sense that this course is better equipped to train future 
contingency contracting leaders; however, it does not provide extensive training of 
administrative duties for the OO operator and its enrollment is limited to NPS graduate 





















Figure 11.   MN 3318 Histogram 
4. Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (51C) 
The SMCT (51C), released in September 2009 in draft format, includes 36 key 
tasks comprising the body of knowledge essential for Army CCOs (51C). Although still 
in draft format, the manual is accessible to all military and civilian personnel with AKO 
user access. This resource is intended to be used as an independent study tool for all new 
51Cs, but its content is typically reinforced at the unit level through a mentor program 
whereby senior 1102s guide junior 51Cs through a proficiency process. The SMCT 
includes 36 primary learning objectives called tasks and 188 supporting learning 
objectives called supporting tasks. The SMCT’s 36 tasks are distributed over four 
chapters: 
 Chapter 1: Unit Engagement Tasks 
 Chapter 2: Pre Award Tasks 
 Chapter 3: Post-award Tasks 
 Chapter 4: Other CCO Tasks (ECC, 2009) 
The SMCT analysis is reported in Table 11. 
 88
Table 11.   SMCT Matrix 
OO LCO IPE
1 2 3 4 5
Task 1-1 Identify Supported Units
Task 1-2 Train Supported Units - Oper. Contract Support
Task 1-3 Advise Supported Units
Task 1-4 Review Contracting Support  Integration Plans
Task 2-1 Procurement Desktop Defense (PD2)
Task 2-2 Review Purchase Rqsts & Supporting Documents
Task 2-3 Conduct Market Research
Task 2-4 Conduct Acquisition Planning
Task 2-5 Document Other Than Full and Open Competition
Task 2-6 Synopsize Proposed Contract Actions
Task 2-7 Solicit  Competition 
Task 2-8 Receive Solicitation Responses
Task 2-9 Evaluate Offers
Task 2-10 Prepare Contract Awards
Task 2-11 Special Funds Codes 
Task 2-12 Unspecified Minor Military Construction 
Task 2-13 Train, Appoint, and Manage CORs 
Task 3-1 Conduct Post award Orientations 
Task 3-2 Notify Unsuccessful Offers Award Synopsis 
Task 3-3 Issue Delivery Orders/Task Orders/BPA Calls
Task 3-4 Exercise Options 
Task 3-5 Monitor Contractor Performance 
Task 3-6 Process Documents for Payments 
Task 3-7 Modify Contracts
Task 3-8 Terminate Contracts
Task 3-9 Conduct Contract Closeout 
Task 3-10 Process Protests 
Task 3-11 Process Claims 
Task 3-12 Process Unauthorized Commitments 
Task 4-1 Use The SF 44
Task 4-2 Train, Appoint, and Manage OOs and FOOs
Task 4-3 Conduct Vendor Education 
Task 4-4 Employ a GPC as a Payment Method and 
Procurement Tool
Task 4-5 Manage Bulk Funds 
Task 4-6 Prepare For Deployment 
Task 4-7 Maintain a PIIN Log 
Summary 7  (9.7%) 28 (38.9%)
29 
(40.3%) 8 (11.1%) 0 (0%)  
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 Task 1-1 requires fundamental knowledge to identify the supported unit’s 
needs and requisite processes. 
 Task 1-2 requires the CCO to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training 
for other CCOs. A CCO who is a senior OO or junior LCO has the 
competency to complete this task. 
 Task 1-3 requires little guidance. There is no expectation for the CCO to 
conduct operational planning and no broad liaison functions required to 
complete this task. 
 Task 1-4 requires the CCO to analyze mission requirements and develop a 
CSIP. The CCO should be able to exploit the local and theater ELOO. 
 Task 2-1 requires fundamental knowledge to complete basic ordering and 
simple buys; but the CCO is expected to be under supervision for this task. 
 Task 2-2 requires the CCO to review PRs and supporting documents. 
Typically, these documents are prepared by a subordinate CCO. The 
reviewing CCO is normally certified DAWIA level I or higher and has a 
moderate understanding of the FAR. 
 Task 2-3 requires an understanding of basic business principles and the 
FAR to conduct market research. The CCO should be prepared to 
coordinate local contracting operations. 
 Task 2-4 requires the CCO to have basic analytical skills, limited 
experience, and a moderate understanding of the FAR. The CCO should be 
prepared to coordinate local contracting operations. 
 Task 2-5 requires a moderate understanding of the FAR and the ability to 
coordinate local contracting operations. This CCO should also be familiar 
with administrative requirements to document other than full and open 
competition contract actions. 
 Task 2-6 requires a moderate understanding of the FAR. The CCO should 
also know the procedures for preparing and posting a synopsis. 
 Task 2-7 requires a moderate understanding of the FAR and the ability to 
coordinate local contracting operations. The CCO is required to have 
significant experience in basic ordering and simple buys. 
 Task 2-8 requires minimal training. The workload includes basic 
administration functions and assumes that the OO is under supervision. 
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 Task 2-9 requires the CCO to be certified DAWIA level I or higher and 
have a moderate understanding of the FAR. The CCO is required to have 
significant experience in basic ordering and simple buys. 
 Task 2-10 requires the CCO to be certified DAWIA level I or higher and 
have a moderate understanding of the FAR. The CCO should also have 
experience in preparing contract awards. 
 Task 2-11 requires the CCO to be certified DAWIA level I or higher and 
have a moderate understanding of the FAR. The CCO is required to 
identify different types of buy programs requiring unique funding codes. 
 Task 2-12 requires the CCO to be certified DAWIA level I or higher and 
have a moderate understanding of the FAR. The CCO should also have 
experience in completing simple contract actions. 
 Task 2-13 requires the CCO to be thoroughly knowledgeable in the FAR 
and DoD acquisition policies, and certified DAWIA level II or higher. 
This CCO is expected to train and manage CORs. 
 Task 3-1 requires the CCO to be able to prepare post-award documents. 
 Task 3-2 requires the CCO to notify unsuccessful offerors through an 
award synopsis. The task requires a moderate understanding of the FAR. 
 Task 3-3 requires the CCO to issue delivery orders, task orders, and work 
with blanket purchase agreements. This task requires no complex contract 
actions. 
 Task 3-4 requires a moderate understanding of the FAR and experience 
with simple contract actions. The CCO is required to evaluate the efficacy 
of a contract and decide if it is in the best interest of the government to 
exercise its associated options. 
 Task 3-5 requires the CCO to review, understand, and inspect the 
requirements of the contractor. The CCO should be able to accurately 
document discrepancies of contractors and train CORs in the monitoring 
of contractor performance. 
 Task 3-6 requires the CCO to review, resolve discrepancies, and process 
documents for payment. The CCO should have sufficient experience to 
complete this task with no supervision. 
 Task 3-7 requires the CCO to review, resolve, and process contract 
modifications. The CCO must be warranted to allocate funds on behalf of 
the government. 
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 Task 3-8 requires the CCO to review and recommend if a contract meets 
the criteria for termination. This competency is expected of a warranted 
contracting officer; it also requires a thorough understanding of the FAR 
and DoD acquisition policies. 
 Task 3-9 requires an extensive understanding of the FAR and broad 
experience with contract actions. The CCO at this level should be 
warranted and must be able to complete contract closeouts. 
 Task 3-10 requires an extensive understanding of the FAR, DoD 
acquisition policies, and GAO protest procedures. 
 Task 3-11 requires the CCO to prepare determinations in accordance with 
the FAR and to process contractor claims. 
 Task 3-12 requires the CCO to determine if a UC has occurred and to 
gather information to process the UC. 
 Task 4-1 requires the CCO to understand the correct utilization of SF 44. 
This task implies that the individual is sufficiently trained and is capable 
of conducting simple buys and purchases with little supervision. 
 Task 4-2 requires the individual to train, appoint, and manage OOs. This 
task implies that the CCO has the authority to appoint OOs and has 
attained the requisite experience and rank (or paygrade). 
 Task 4-3 requires the CCO to have knowledge of the local economy and 
the skill to coordinate the education of vendors in the area of operation. 
 Task 4-4 requires the knowledge to conduct basic orders and simple buys 
using a GPC. This task implies that the CCO requires minimal guidance 
and has no DAIWA certifications. 
 Task 4-5 requires a moderate understanding of the FAR, and the individual 
should be certified DAWIA level I or higher. 
 Task 4-6 requires a fundamental understanding of the FAR and a sufficient 
experience level to complete basic contingency contracting actions. 
 Task 4-7 requires the knowledge to maintain a PIIN log. This task requires 
a technical understanding commensurate with an experienced OO. 
Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of the 36 primary learning objectives for the 
SMCT (51C), which is generally concentrated on tier level 2-3. The analysis reports that 
seven of the 36 primary learning objectives are tier level 1-2, 21 of the 36 are tier level 2-
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3, and the remaining eight are tier level 3-4. On the basis of the rating scale, category 2 
received 38.9% of the hits and category 3 received 40.3%. The remaining hits were 
spread between categories 1 and 4 receiving 9.7% and 11.1%, respectively. Therefore, 
the SMCT (51C) neither emphasizes its course content on the new and inexperienced OO, 
nor on the well-experienced LCO or IPE CCO. The research suggests that the SMCT’s 
target audience should be the experienced OO or the junior LCO. Like CON 234, the 
SMCT’s ideal student is a junior practitioner certified at DAWIA level I or higher who 
has acquired an intermediate acquisition knowledge base, who possesses mature OO skill 



















Figure 12.    SMCT (51C) Histogram 
C. COMPOSITE RESULTS 
Figure 13 illustrates the relationship of the four courses on a radar chart. 
Specifically, each course is arrayed on the chart according to their percentage frequency 
of hits within the five primary learning objective categories, which are displayed in 
clockwise fashion beginning at the top of the chart. Notice that the further from the center 
a course’s category is positioned, the more prominently that course’s primary learning 
objectives are represented by the category. By extension, this figure visually 
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Figure 13.   Composite Radar Chart 
CON 234 is a tier level 2-3; categories 2 and 3 received 88.8% of the hits. 
Therefore, CON 234 neither emphasizes its course content on the inexperienced OO nor 
on the vastly experienced senior LCO. We anticipated this finding because CON 234 is 
designed to train contracting professionals from junior enlisted personnel to mid-grade 
officers who have never deployed to a contingency contracting operation. The developing 
CCO must complete several fundamental DAU courses prior to taking CON 234 in 
accordance with the CCO core training model. This requirement accounts for the fact that 
less than 6% of CON 234 focuses on the lowest category (1-OO), which is otherwise 
gained by the CCO in mission-focused courses such as CON 120. Likewise, the target 
audience of CON 234 lacks the more advanced education, experience, and rank, to 
employ the learning objectives of higher tier levels; less than 6% of the course’s content 
is concentrated at categories 4 or 5. The research suggests that CON 234’s target 
audience should be the junior practitioner certified at DAWIA level I or higher who has 
acquired an intermediate acquisition knowledge base, who possesses mature OO skill 
sets, and who is preparing to develop LCO proficiencies. 
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CON 334 is a tier level 4-5; categories 4 and 5 received 85.8% of the hits. 
Therefore, CON 334 does not emphasize its course content on the inexperienced LCO or 
below. We anticipated this finding because the course is an advanced contingency 
contracting course that prepares senior level contracting personnel who are deploying to 
contract management positions. This course description accounts for the fact that less 
than 15% of the course material focuses on the lowest three categories of the model. 
CON 234 is a prerequisite for CON 334; therefore, the CCO is ideally trained at the 
lower tier levels before enrolling in CON 334. The research suggests that CON 334’s 
target audience should be the mature LCO or the advanced acquisition planner who must 
regularly contribute to (or is a member of) a theater COCOM staff or joint task force. The 
individual should have completed advanced education, to include joint military 
professional training, and typically should be certified at DAWIA level III. He or she 
should also be able to develop and execute CSIP requirements in support of OPLAN and 
OPORD requirements. 
MN 3318 spans categories 3, 4, and 5; its course content comprises tier levels 3-4 
and 4-5. On the modified model, category 4 received the most hits at 40% and categories 
3 and 5 each received 25%. Due to the symmetry about category 4, we elected to 
designate MN 3318’s course content as equally representing tier level 3-4 and tier level 
4-5. Therefore, MN 3318 does not emphasize its course content on the individual 
operating below a LCO level. We anticipated this finding because the course is instructed 
at a graduate education level for mid-grade officers who are preparing to assume 
positions of greater responsibility within the contingency contracting field. This graduate 
level format accounts for the fact that only 10% of the course material focuses on the 
lowest two categories of the model. Yet the course does not mimic CON 334 because, as 
a CON 234 equivalency, it must additionally provide coursework at the LCO level, which 
most of its students have not previously completed nor experienced in the field. 
Additionally, basic contract management training is provided in the NPS curriculum 
before graduate students enroll in MN 3318. The research suggests that MN 3318’s target 
audience is the NPS student; however, its course content is suitable for most LCOs 
(beginning or more advanced) and for senior acquisition planners. 
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The SMCT (51C) is a tier level 2-3; categories 2 and 3 received 79.2% of the hits. 
Therefore, the SMCT (51C) neither emphasizes its course content on the new and 
inexperienced OO, nor on the well-experienced LCO or IPE CCO. We anticipated this 
finding because the SMCT is tailored to augment the fundamental training that Army 
soldiers and civilians receive from the DAU’s CCO core training model. This objective 
accounts for the fact that less than 10% of the SMCT focuses on the lowest category (1-
OO), which is otherwise gained through standard DAU training, and the remaining 
11.1% is concentrated at category 4. The research suggests that the SMCT’s target 
audience should be the experienced OO or the junior LCO. Like CON 234, the SMCT’s 
ideal student is a junior practitioner certified at DAWIA level I or higher who has 
acquired an intermediate acquisition knowledge base, who possesses mature OO skill 
sets, and who is beginning to develop LCO proficiencies. 
We found significant “overlap” between CON 234, MN 3318, and the SMCT 
(51C); we also identified significant overlap between MN 3318 and CON 334. We 
anticipated overlap between CON 234 and the SMCT, given the similarities of each 
courses’ target audiences and the premise that the Army’s intent for the SMCT (51C) is to 
augment the training received in CON 234 and the DAU’s CCO core training model. The 
learning objectives comprising CON 234 and the SMCT are not entirely similar, but both 
courses emphasize skill sets that prepare junior CCOs for their first contingency 
contracting deployment. MN 3318 contains category 3 elements of CON 234 and the 
SMCT, but it primarily focuses on the more advanced categories 4 and 5. We anticipated 
some overlap between MN 3318 and CON 234 because the DAU granted CON 234 
equivalency for MN 3318 in 2004, and the NPS must ensure that relevant learning 
objectives remain consistent in order to uphold its accreditation. Figure 14 illustrates the 
relationship between CON 234, MN3318, and the SMCT (51C) by comparing their 











Figure 14.   CON 234, MN 3318, and the SMCT (51C) 
We also discovered overlap between MN 3318 and CON 334. We anticipated this 
overlap because both target audiences include military and civilian leaders within the 
contingency contracting community. The learning objectives comprising MN 3318 and 
CON 334 are not entirely similar—as described previously, MN 3318 more prominently 
touches category 3 by design—but both primarily concentrate on the higher echelons of 
the YTTM and our modified model. Figure 15 illustrates the relationship between CON 












Figure 15.   CON 334 and MN 3318 
D. SUMMARY 
Chapter IV provided a comparative analysis of the primary and supporting 
learning objectives for each of the four courses. The analysis incorporated the use of a 
benchmark hierarchical model, the YTTM, and a quantitative rating scheme that 
exploited the YTTM’s hierarchical nature with respect to its four defining elements: 
function, education, skill set, and personnel and manpower attributes. Supporting learning 
objectives were rated by each member of our research team, and primary learning 
objectives were accordingly graded and positioned along a four-tier model, which is a 
modification to the original YTTM that allows a primary learning objective to straddle 
more than one tier level of the YTTM. We examined the relative similarities and 
differences between the four courses, the extent to which each course benefits CCOs of 
varying targeted levels of proficiency, and whether the intent of each course is met in 
relation to its course description and targeted audience. 
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Chapter V, PAT Validation, describes our support efforts to the ECC including 




















V. PAT ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the process utilized by our research team 
to format the Proficiency Assessment Test (PAT) into multiple digital assessments.  We 
will present this data in the following manner.  First, we will discuss the selection process 
utilized to identify the Web-based software platform for PAT validation to take place at 
two test locations.  Second, identify which of the 36 tasks within the SMCT where both or 
at least one of the test sites failed to achieve a passing score (80%), as determined by the 
ECC.  Third, of the failed tasks we identified the questions in which test takers answered 
correctly less than 50% of the time.  Our efforts were in direct support of the ECC’s 
initiative to train CCOs for future operations.   
The ECC and the NPS partnered in a previous endeavor to develop the PAT 
questions to test a contracting officer’s knowledge of the SMCT.  Arzu et al. (2010) 
developed question pools for each of the 36 tasks within the SMCT, but validation of the 
test questions was outside of their research scope.  Their efforts resulted in the 
development of question pools ranging between 20 and 40 task-dependent multiple 
choice questions.  This chapter describes our efforts to select a Web-based testing 
platform, and build PATs, and administer two testing events. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 “Gansler Report” called for the development of an expeditionary 
contracting manual stating: 
Much like an infantryman has a field manual, expeditionary contracting 
officers need a quick reference tool that allows them to practice 
expeditionary contracting before setting foot in-theater and to continue 
using the same reference while deployed. Most important, contracting 
personnel must be trained and thoroughly familiar with the Expeditionary 
Contracting Manual prior to deployment. Doing it for the first time in-
theater is not acceptable. (Gansler, 2007) 
The resulting manual is the SMCT, in which the ECC serves as the proponent for 
development.  The SMCT is composed of 36 mission essential tasks all 51C’s should be 
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able to accomplish prior to deployment.  As part of our research we converted 35 of the 
36 tasks into Web-based assessments. Task 2-1 was not converted into Web-based format 
because the scope of the task was under development during this project.  We designed 
this Web-based test to accomplish 3 goals: 
1. provide a tool for the ECC to validate the PAT questions, thus assisting 
the ECC in preparing CCOs for operations in contingency environments;  
2. provide a digital platform to rapidly administer the test to a large number 
of CCO’s in potentially remote locations if needed; and  
3. use analytical tools inherent to the chosen software to assist in the 
interpretation of the assessment results. 
The ECC’s initial requirements included four key performance parameters (KPP).  
The following four requirements shaped the selection of the software required to 
administer the PAT: 
1. must be a Web-based platform that can store unlimited results for 
indefinite time; 
2. must have online security features to include password protection and 
ability to limit users; 
3. should have built in analytical tools to assist examining the results; and 
4. allows an administrator to form question pools in which the software will 
randomly select a preset number of questions from the pool and randomly 
organize the answers differently every time the test is taken.    
Our market research utilized these 4 KPPs as elimination criteria for the available 
commercial software products.  It was also important for us to find a commercial off the 
shelf (COTs) solution that was simple to use, thus facilitating a more rapid conversion of 
the previously developed questions into the selected software’s format.   
Our efforts resulted in the conversion of over 1,400 questions to the format of the 
selected software.  We completed this task in 140 hours over approximately 3 weeks.  
The ECC used our selected software solution in testing all 35 tasks at two locations in 
June 2010.  The validation of the test was a success according to the feedback received 
from the ECC.  
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B. MARKET RESEARCH 
A LPTA source selection approach was used in lieu of a trade off approach.  We 
anticipated that the COTS software that we selected would not serve as a long term 
solution for the ECC. This was based on the assumption that the selected software would 
not meet the long term requirements of the ECC to maintain ownership of the data, 
provide a sufficient level of security, and allow for customization.  Our method of market 
research involved exploring all available options by conducting online searches for 
software.  We researched available COTS test-administering software services, and 
ultimately evaluated six potential providers.  Subject matter experts were queried at the 
NPS to determine if products were available in the commercial market.  After selecting 
the software, we built 35 Web-based assessments within a six week period.   
C. SELECTION FACTORS 
We based the evaluation factors on four of the ECC’s technical requirements.  
The four factors were all of equal weight, and price alone was the determining factor in 
selecting the software.  We did not consider past performance in the evaluation process.  
Table 12 shows our four technical evaluation factors and the six products that we 
evaluated.  Product A and Product B failed to fulfill all key technical requirements 
resulting in immediate elimination.  Of the remaining products, we selected the software 
with the lowest price available for eight months of unlimited service.  
Table 12.   LPTA Evaluation 
TECHNICAL EVALUATION FACTOR Product A Product B Product C Product D Product E Product F
WEB‐BASED SOFTWARE THAT CAN STORE 
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Based on the technical factors, Product F fulfilled the requirement at the lowest 
price.  We discovered that some providers offered additional features resulting in greater 
capabilities, but they were not considered due to our LPTA approach.  As previously 
stated we did not see Product F as an enduring solution, but as the LPTA solution to 
validate the PAT within the scope of our research project.    
D. PRODUCT F FEATURES 
Product F met all four of our selection criteria.  Product F additionally allowed us 
to experiment utilizing a free trial period which allowed us to initiate construction of the 
PAT and evaluate its features. We determined Product F to be the most simple software 
solution to convert the PAT questions from Microsoft Word format to the testing 
software’s format.  Product F had numerous features that made it attractive to validating 
the PAT questions.  Product F allowed the administrator to use preformatted templates to 
tailor the assessment to provide a more professional appearance.  Product F also provided 
two options for administering the test to a potential test taker.  Option 1 allowed the 
administrator to send a test link directly to the tester via email.  Option 2 allowed the 
administrator to link the test to his/her Web page.  Product F includes numerous 
evaluation tools that can be utilized to examine an array of results for each assessment.  
For example, product F allows the administrator to create a maximum of eight 
demographic filters (e.g., experience level, rank, DAWIA certification level).  
Additionally, each assessment can be analyzed according to test takers’ collective 
responses (e.g., percentage of correct responses per question).  We input the demographic 
filters for each of the 35 assessments in accordance with the ECC’s requirements.  
Product F provided five features to assist in administrative controls.  First, the 
administrator has the ability to password-protect each assessment so that an individual 
taking the assessment must be sent a link and a password.  Second, the administrator can 
set parameters to limit the number of attempts for each assessment.  Third, the 
administrator can set parameters to allow access only via matching email address.  
Fourth, the administrator can set the parameters to view every assessment that has been 
initiated.  Last, the administrator can set parameters to identify up to 50 people to be 
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notified when an assessment is completed.  While product F’s administrative controls are 
robust, we recognize that management of the preceding features requires an exorbitant 
amount of time.  
Despite all of product F’s positive features, it lacks the needed security features 
for long term implementation within the Army.  For example, the Army utilizes Defense 
Knowledge Online (DKO) and Army Knowledge Online (AKO) as the host to conduct 
DOD, Army directed training (e.g., Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape [SERE 100]).  The 
aforementioned DKO and AKO utilize a Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) 
internet protocol; meanwhile, product F uses an unsecured internet protocol.   
E. PAT CONSTRUCTION AND ADMINISTRATION 
While the construction and administration of the PAT was a joint effort, we took 
the lead in the construction of each assessment while the ECC took the lead in 
administering (i.e., proctoring) the assessments.  As previously discussed, we converted 
over 1,400 multiple choice questions and responses from Microsoft Word format to the 
testing software’s format.  Before converting the test questions, we customized the test 
template of product F in accordance with the ECC’s requirements.  We then developed 
eight demographic filters for each assessment in partnership with the ECC.    The PAT 
was administered at Ft. Riley, Kansas and at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky in June 2010. 
ECC’s original intent was for the 35 assessments to be conducted at the two test 
sites and for each test taker to answer all questions associated with a given task.  At Ft. 
Riley the plan was executed as intended by the ECC; however, at Ft. Campbell the ECC 
administered only half the test questions to the target audience, and furthermore 
implemented a random test question format (a feature of product F).  Specifically, at Ft. 
Campbell two test takers might be asked different questions for the same assessment. The 
change in technique for administering the PAT made validation of the questions by the 
ECC difficult due to an insignificant statistical number of responses.  In all 26 individuals 
at the two testing sites were tested.  The tested population included CCOs, 1102s, and 
contract specialist interns.  At the end of the second test we turned over maintenance and 
administration responsibility associated with Product F to the ECC.   
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F. METHODOLOGY 
PAT results are presented in the following fashion.  First, by providing a 
comparison of overall test scores at both test sites by chapter of the SMCT.  Second, by 
identifying those tasks where at least one of the test locations failed to achieve a passing 
score (80%).  Third, we will review where we rated each failed task on the YTTM.  
Lastly, we will identify the questions that were incorrectly answered more than 50% of 
the time.  
G. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
The following section reports the average scores by testing site and task.  As 
previously introduced in chapter III of this report, the SMCT is comprised of four 
chapters and 36 tasks.  Chapter 1, Unit Engagement Tasks, has four tasks.  Chapter 2, Pre 
Award Tasks, has 13 tasks.  Chapter 3, Post-award Tasks, has 12 tasks.  Chapter 4, Other 
CCO Tasks, has 7 tasks.   
1. Chapter 1 
As depicted in Figure 16, scores were very similar between the two test sites.  
There was only one task in chapter 1 where at least one of the sites failed to achieve an 
80% average.  The failed task was task 1-4, entitled Review Contracting Support 
Integration Plan.  The validate test group averaged a 60% and the random test group 
averaged a 64% on this task.  In the previous chapter, we determined task 1-4 to be at tier 




Figure 16.   SMCT Chapter 1 Average Scores 
There were eight total questions in Task 1-4 where test takers failed to achieve an 
average score of 50%.  (See Appendix F). 
2. Chapter 2 
As depicted in Figure 17, scores were generally similar between the two test sites.  
There were a few tasks where there was a 10-point or more difference in average test 
score.  Those tasks were Task 2-9, which had an 11-point difference, task 2-11 which had 
a 16-point difference, and task 2-13 which had a 14-point difference.   
There were four tasks in Chapter II where at least one of the sites failed to achieve 
an 80% average.  The first of those was task 2-5, entitled Document Other Than Full and 
Open Competition.  The validate test group averaged a 79% and the random test group 
averaged a 77% on this task.  The next task was task 2-6, entitled Synopsize Proposed 
Contract Actions. The validate test group averaged a 68% and the random test group 
averaged a 70% on this task.   
The third failed task was task 2-7, entitled Solicit Competition. The validate test 
group averaged a 72% and the random test group averaged a 77% on this task. Lastly was 




 averaged a 67% and the random test group averaged a 72% on this task.  All four failed 
tasks in chapter 2 were placed at tier level 2-3 on the YTTM, which makes these tasks 
commensurate with that of an apprentice.  
 
Figure 17.   SMCT Chapter 2 Average Scores 
There were four total questions in Task 2-5 where test takers failed to achieve an 
average score of 50%.  There were seven total questions in Task 2-6 where test takers 
failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There were six total questions in Task 2-7 
where test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There were four total 
questions in Task 2-12 where test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%. (See 
Appendix F for missed questions) 
3. Chapter 3 
As depicted in Figure 18, scores were generally similar between the two test sites.  
There was only one task where there was a 10-point or more difference in average test 
score.  That task was Task 3-2, which had a 15-point difference.   
There were nine tasks in chapter 3 where at least one of the sites failed to achieve 
an 80% average.  The first of those was task 3-2, entitled Notify Unsuccessful Offers of 
Award Synopsis.  The validate test group averaged a 61% and the random test group 
averaged a 76% on this task.  The next task was task 3-3, entitled Issue Delivery Orders, 
Task Orders, and BPA Calls. The validate test group averaged a 70% and the random test 
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group averaged a 77% on this task.  The third failed task was task 3-6, entitled Process 
Documentation for Payments. The validate test group averaged a 70% and the random 
test group averaged a 78% on this task.  
The fourth was task 3-7, entitled Modify Contracts. The validate test group 
averaged a 66% and the random test group averaged a 73% on this task.  The fifth was 
task 3-8, entitled Terminate Contracts.  The validate test group averaged a 65% and the 
random test group averaged a 69% on this task. The sixth was task 3-9, entitled Conduct 
Contract Closeout. The validate test group averaged a 65% and the random test group 
averaged a 67% on this task.  
The seventh was task 3-10, entitled Process Protests. The validate test group 
averaged a 57% and the random test group averaged a 63% on this task.  The eighth was 
task 3-11, entitled Process Claims.  The validate test group averaged a 76% and the 
random test group averaged a 73% on this task. The ninth was task 3-12, entitled Process 
Unauthorized Commitments. The validate test group averaged a 78% and the random test 
group averaged a 79% on this task.  
Of the nine failed tasks in chapter 3, task 3-3 was placed at tier level 1-3 on the 
YTTM, which makes it commensurate with that of an intern.  Tasks 3-2, 3-6, 3-11 and 3-
12 were placed at tier level 2-3 on the YTTM, which makes them commensurate with 
that of an apprentice.  Meanwhile tasks 3-7, 3-8, 3-9 and 3-10 were placed at tier level 3-
4 on the YTTM, which makes them commensurate with that of a journeyman. 
 
 
Figure 18.   SMCT Chapter 3 Average Scores 
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There were six total questions in Task 3-2 where test takers failed to achieve an 
average score of 50%.  There were eight total questions in Task 3-3 where test takers 
failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There were nine total questions in Task 3-6 
where test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There were nine total 
questions in Task 3-7 where test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There 
were eleven total questions in Task 3-8 where test takers failed to achieve an average 
score of 50%.  There were eight total questions in Task 3-9 where test takers failed to 
achieve an average score of 50%.  There were twelve total questions in Task 3-10 where 
test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There were four total questions in 
Task 3-11 where test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  There were two 
total questions in Task 3-12 where test takers failed to achieve an average score of 50%.  
(See Appendix F for missed questions)   
4. Chapter 4 
As depicted in Figure 19, scores were generally similar between the two test sites.  
There was only one task in chapter 4, where at least one of the sites failed to achieve an 
80% average.  The failed task was task 4-4, Employ a GPC as a Payment Method and 
Employment Tool.  The validate test group averaged a 78% and the random test group 
averaged a 75% on this task.  In the previous chapter, we determined task 4-4 to be at tier 
level 1-2 on the YTTM, which makes this task commensurate with that of an intern. 
 
Figure 19.   SMCT Chapter 4 Average Scores 
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There were six total questions in Task 4-4 where test takers failed to achieve an 
average score of 50%.  (See Appendix F for missed questions) 
H. SUMMARY 
Our analysis of the 15 failed tasks revealed that 14% of the failed tasks were 
classified as intern tasks, 53% were apprentice tasks, and 33% were journeyman tasks.  
We anticipated this distribution of failed tasks by the examinees because these results are 
similar to the composition of the SMCT’s course content.  In Chapter IV our course 
analysis of the 36 SMCT tasks highlighted that 20% of the tasks were intern tasks, 58% 
were apprentice tasks, and 22% were journeyman tasks.  There is not enough evidence to 
conclude that the distributions of the failed tasks from the PAT results and the 
composition of the SMCT’s tier levels (intern, apprentice, journeyman) are different. 
We found Product F to be a very efficient tool in validating the PAT test 
questions when test groups were required to answer every question within the test pool.  
The analytical tools associated with Product F allow an administrator to rapidly 
determine how often a question was missed and what answer was most selected when a 
question was answered incorrectly.  This is a very power tool in determining if a question 
lacks clarity or content.  It also allows the administrator to immediately focus on 
questions that may need to be reviewed.    
As a tool to implement the test across the Army we found Product F to be 
deficient in its security features.  We feel implementing product F as a long term solution 
would be high risk; however, we see this as a quick and efficient way to validate/correct 
questions associated with the PAT,  
If implemented correctly the PAT will provide the ECC leadership a benchmark 
to determine how well prepared the contingency contracting workforce is to accomplish 
the task found within the SMCT.  The PAT could identify organizational knowledge 
shortfalls and this information could be used to develop training plans at the brigade and 
battalion levels.  The PAT could also identify knowledgeable employees and those 
needing additional mentorship.  Knowing organizational shortfalls would allow leaders to 
make a conscious decision which areas to train or if in a time constrained environment 
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which areas to assume risk by omission.  The PAT could also be used a certification tool 
for deployment readiness at the individual and team levels to prepare CCOs to serve in 
contingency environments. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
A. SUMMARY   
This research report examined the fundamental educational resources available to 
the contemporary contingency contracting officer. We comparatively analyzed four 
contingency contracting educational resources: the Defense Acquisition University’s 
CON 234 Joint Contingency Contracting and CON 334 Advanced Contingency 
Contracting; the Naval Postgraduate School’s MN 3318 Principles of Contingency 
Contracting; and the U.S. Army’s Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (51C) for 
contingency contracting officers. We examined three factors pertaining to the courses: the 
relative similarities and differences between the four courses; the extent to which each 
course benefits contingency contracting officers of varying targeted levels of proficiency; 
and whether the intent of each course is met in relation to its course description and 
targeted audience. The analysis incorporated the use of a benchmark hierarchical model, 
the Yoder Three-tier Model. We categorized curricular learning objectives across the 
Yoder Three-tier Model’s hierarchy and, by applying a quantitative rating scheme to the 
model, differentiated the four courses. 
Our research additionally evaluated the efficacy of the Yoder Three-tier Model as 
a personnel structure model for senior planners and commanders to use to align 
contracting resources with mission requirements. However, this research objective was 
limited by our evaluation method of applying the model exclusively as a tool for 
differentiating contingency contracting courses. We did not examine empirical evidence 
of the model’s intended application in authentic contingency contracting operations, 
which was not within the scope of our research. Lastly, we assisted the Army’s 
Expeditionary Contracting Command in the fielding and validation of a proficiency 
assessment test for the Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (51C) via a secure Web-based 
platform. Our research efforts in this regard included: conducting market research of 
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Web-based test software, designing the user interface, inputting over 1,400 test questions, 
and analyzing examinee results from two testing events.   
B. CONCLUSION 
This section will answer the following research questions which were introduced 
in Chapter I.  These questions are: 
 
1. How do CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318 and the SMCT compare? 
2. To what extent does each course benefit CCOs of varying targeted levels 
of proficiency? 
3. Is the intent of each course met in relation to its course description and 
targeted audience? 
4. Is the YTTM, although originally designed as a personnel structure 
model, an effective tool for comparing contingency contracting 
educational resources? 
5. How effective is the recommended Web-based testing platform in 
validating the PAT? 
6. Is this product a sustainable solution for the ECC? 
 
Question 1. How do CON 234, CON 334, MN 3318 and the SMCT (51C)  
   compare? 
Primary learning objectives of CON 234, MN 3318, and the SMCT (51C) are 
significantly related. The commonality between CON 234 and the SMCT (51C) is logical 
because the courses are intended for similar target audiences and the Army intends to use 
the SMCT (51C) as an augmentative training resource for individuals who have 
completed CON 234. The learning objectives comprising CON 234 and the SMCT (51C) 
are not entirely similar, but both courses emphasize skill sets that prepare junior CCOs 
for their first contingency contracting deployment. Meanwhile, MN 3318 contains 
category 3 elements of both CON 234 and the SMCT (51C), but it primarily focuses on 
the more advanced categories 4 and 5 of our rating scheme. The commonality between 
MN 3318 and CON 234 is rational because the DAU grants CON 234 equivalency for 
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MN 3318, and the NPS must ensure that relevant learning objectives remain consistent in 
order to uphold this accreditation.  Figure 20 illustrates the relationship between CON 











Figure 20.   CON 234, MN 3318, and the SMCT (51C) 
Primary learning objectives of MN 3318 and CON 334 are also significantly 
related. This commonality is logical because both courses target audiences that include 
military and civilian leaders within the contingency contracting community. The learning 
objectives comprising MN 3318 and CON 334 are not entirely similar—as described 
previously, MN 3318 more prominently touches category 3 by design—but both courses 
primarily concentrate on the integrated planner and executor tier of the Yoder Three-tier 
Model and the higher echelons of our modified model.  Figure 21 illustrates the 











Figure 21.   CON 334 and MN 3318 
Question 2. To what extent does each course benefit CCOs of varying  
  targeted levels of proficiency? 
CON 234 prepares CCOs to perform at the apprentice level in accordance with 
our modified YTTM model described in Table 7. An apprentice, as defined by our 
model, is one who is a junior practitioner certified at DAWIA level I or higher, has a 
moderate understanding of the FAR and related acquisition knowledge, and has 
developed mature OO skill sets. 
CON 334 prepares CCOs to perform at the master level in accordance with our 
modified YTTM model. A master is one who possesses both advanced acquisition 
planning experience and a mature acquisition knowledge base. This individual also has 
completed advanced degree(s) and joint professional military training. A master is 
typically DAWIA level III certified and regularly contributes to (or is a staff member of) 
a theater COCOM or joint task force. He or she is able to articulate OPLAN and OPORD 
requirements in support of national security objectives through CSIP contributions. 
MN 3318 prepares CCOs to perform equally at the journeyman and master levels 
in accordance with our modified YTTM model. A journeyman is one who is certified at 
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DAWIA level II or higher and is able to plan and execute contracting solutions for an 
operational commander. This individual possesses a well-developed acquisition 
knowledge base and is able to leverage the local economy when deployed. He or she, as a 
senior LCO, understands the role of IPEs and often contributes planning input to IPEs, 
but has not attained sufficient education and planning experience to develop CSIPs as a 
joint staff member. The MN 3318 graduate is additionally prepared to perform at the 
master level, whose attributes are described in the previous paragraph. 
The SMCT (51C) prepares CCOs to perform at the apprentice level in accordance 
with our modified YTTM model. An apprentice is defined in the opening paragraph 
similarly describing the CON 234 graduate in response to this research question.  Figure 
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Question 3. Is the intent of each course met in relation to its course   
  description and targeted audience? 
CON 234: Yes. The DAU describes CON 234 as a course that prepares CCOs for 
an initial deployment to a contingency contracting operation. This course includes topics 
on the practical application of contracting processes in a contingency environment, 
assessing customer requirements, support planning, and ethics in contracting (DAU, 
2010a). We conclude that CON 234 does meet the intent of its course description because 
our research model recognizes CON 234 graduates as apprentices, which is 
commensurate with the DAU’s representation of the course’s primary learning 
objectives. 
CON 334: Yes. The DAU describes CON 334 as a course that prepares senior 
acquisition professionals with the requisite knowledge for coordinating theater 
contracting resources, improving source selection procedures, managing contract 
resolutions, and developing ethical integrity (DAU, 2010c). We conclude that CON 334 
does meet the intent of its course description because our research model recognizes 
CON 334 graduates as masters, which is commensurate with the DAU’s representation of 
the course’s primary learning objectives. 
MN 3318: Yes. The NPS describes MN 3318 as a course that prepares mid-grade 
military officers and federal service civilian 1102s for positions of greater responsibility 
within the contingency contracting field. This course includes topics on deliberate and 
crisis action planning, coordinating with staff elements in a joint planning environment, 
and synchronizing contract actions with OPLANs and OPORDs (Yoder, 2010). 
Additionally, in order to maintain the course’s accreditation as a CON 234 equivalency, 
MN 3318 teaches basic principles of contingency contracting and the fundamental skills 
required to provide direct contracting support to joint tactical and operational forces 
operating across the ROMO. We conclude that MN 3318 does meet the intent of its 
course description because our research model recognizes MN 3318 graduates as 
journeymen and masters, which is commensurate with the NPS’s representation of the 
course’s primary learning objectives. While MN 3318 is an equivalent to CON 234, its 
graduates are not considered apprentices under our research model because MN 3318’s 
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learning objectives are concentrated at the model’s higher echelons; yet, MN 3318 has 
sufficient course content to satisfy the DAU’s accreditation requirements for CON 234. 
The SMCT (51C): Conditional yes. As a U.S. Army Soldier Training Publication, 
no course description exists for the SMCT. However, this manual was written to augment 
the fundamental training that Army soldiers and civilians receive from the DAU’s CCO 
core training model, which includes CON 234. As such, an individual is not typically 
introduced to the SMCT he or she completes some or all of the DAU’s core training for 
CCOs, or unless the individual has demonstrated competency in completing bona fide 
contingency contracting actions prior to completing the requisite DAU education. In this 
respect, we assert that the SMCT does meet the intent as an augmentative training 
resource to the DAU’s CCO core training curriculum because our research model 
recognizes that individuals who are proficient in SMCT (51C) course content perform at 
the apprentice level, which is commensurate with someone who has completed CON 
234—a component of the DAU’s educational track for CCOs. 
Question 4. Is the YTTM, although originally designed as a personnel  
  structure model, an effective tool for comparing contingency  
  contracting educational resources? 
Yes, with some modification to the model. The research model that we adapted 
from the YTTM incorporates an evaluation system that modifies the YTTM from its 
original three tier levels to four in order to provide a greater degree of flexibility for 
ranking the courses’ primary learning objectives hierarchically.  Figure 23 shows the 
relationship between contingency contracting educational resources, our modified YTTM 
model, and the original YTTM.  
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Figure 23.   Modification of YTTM 
 118
Question 5. How effective is the recommended Web-based testing   
  platform in validating the PAT? 
The testing platform that we selected is adequately effective in validating the PAT 
because it permits administrators to analyze responses to multiple-choice test questions 
using an array of statistical parameters. For example, administrators can review the 
percentage of correct responses for a particular test question by demographic criteria 
(e.g., paygrade, unit, or test site). Accordingly, PAT questions can be modified or 
eliminated, if required, based on relevancy, difficulty, or clarity; similarly, the SMCT can 
be revised to improve correct response rates for particular test questions. Additionally, 
this testing software is Web-based; hence, the PAT can be disseminated efficiently to 
large pools of CCOs. 
Question 6. Is this product a sustainable solution for the ECC? 
No. While the testing software is adequate for validating the PAT, it lacks 
administrative features and controls that the ECC requires for its long-term CCO 
assessment program. For example, the software limits the number of administrators 
requiring user rights. Additionally, the product lacks security features that are required by 
the U.S. Army, such as a configuration for secure internet protocol. Lastly, the software, 
in its current state, is complex for the novice user and is laborious to create user accounts. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of our research conclusions, we recommend the following three 
administrative actions: 
 1. MN 3318 should be a CON 234 and CON 334 equivalent   
The NPS should validate its MN 3318 course content to attain dual equivalency 
accreditation for CON 234 and CON 334 by the DAU. MN 3318 is currently accredited 
as a CON 234 equivalency. In our research we concluded that the primary learning 
objectives for CON 234 and MN 3318 are significantly correlated, but we also reached 
the same conclusion for CON 334 and MN 3318. CON 334 was recently launched in 
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August 2010; this may impede any immediate attempts by the NPS to gain accreditation 
because the DAU will likely undergo an internal validation period for CON 334 before 
sanctioning non-DAU syllabi for the course. 
2.  Leverage existing information technology within the DoD to deliver 
 the PAT 
The ECC, upon validation of the PAT for the SMCT (51C), should utilize an 
existing Army Knowledge Online or Defense Knowledge Online testing platform for the 
PAT’s administration. Either resource would ensure that administrative and security 
controls are congruent with the Army’s conventional protocols and that maintenance and 
support issues are mitigated. While this solution does not guarantee an optimal testing 
platform for the ECC, it bridges the gap between a costly commercial product that is 
uniquely designed to meet the ECC’s desires and an unreliable COTS solution that lacks 
robustness and risks security and data. 
3. Apply the modified YTTM to maximize fiscal resources for CCO  
  training    
The ECC should use the modified YTTM from this research project as a tool to 
determine optimal training plans for CCOs in accordance with available educational 
funding.  The Efficiencies Initiative mandated by the Secretary of Defense in 2010 
requires that the DoD improves its contracting and acquisition processes; however, this 
objective must be reached within a fiscally constrained environment.  The modified 
YTTM will help leaders effectively shape the workforce for future assignements, identify 
billets that have specific education requirements, and prudently allocate limited training 
dollars. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following four topics were not incorporated into our research objectives. We 
recommend that other research teams assume these areas for further research. 
1. Relationship between the six-phase contracting model and the SMCT (51C) 
tasks. 
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The contract management process can be analyzed using a six-phase model.  The 
six phases consist of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source 
selection, contract administration, and contract close out (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  A 
research team could determine how the 36 tasks span the six-phase model and 
subsequently analyze PAT results to evaluate the proficiency levels of CCOs with respect 
to each of the six phases. 
2. PAT Validation  
The two testing events described in Chapter V did not produce statistically 
significant data. The ECC intends to increase the size of its testing pool to effectively 
validate its PAT. However, the ECC headquarters lacks personnel resources to efficiently 
proctor and analyze PAT responses. We recommend that a research team conduct a joint 
applied project with the ECC to proctor and analyze a statistically significant sample of 
test questions to eligible CCOs in order to validate the PAT. The research efforts will 
mutually benefit the ECC and the research team by providing administrative assistance to 
the ECC while giving the researchers an opportunity to apply test theory and data 
analysis in an academic setting. Additionally, the ECC anticipates developing a SMCT for 
senior level CCOs in the near future; this would instigate the need for an additional PAT 
to be validated. 
3. Information Technology  
While we recommend that the ECC utilize an existing Army Knowledge Online 
or Defense Knowledge Online testing platform for the PAT’s administration, we 
recognize that other solutions may be feasible. Accordingly, we recommend that a 
research team develop a long-term testing software for the ECC to implement for PAT 
administration. The research team’s members should include individuals who are 
proficient in programming and knowledgeable in software development. 
4. Joint PAT Implementation 
Finally, we recommend that a research team analyze sample data that consist of 
responses from non-Army contracting personnel. Typically, contemporary contingency 
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contracting operations are joint in nature. This study would validate the relevance, 
accuracy, and corroborative attributes of the SMCT (51C) across military departments. 
Chapter VI presented our responses to the six research questions, proposed three 
recommendations, and identified four areas for further research based on the research and 
analysis that we conducted throughout this project.  Our research examined the 
similarities and differences among the four courses available to the contemporary CCO, 
the relevance of the YTTM, and the effectiveness of the PAT.  The body of this work will 
help leaders effectively shape the acquisition workforce for future assignments, identify 
billets that have specific education requirements, and prudently allocate limited training 
dollars. 
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APPENDIX A—CON 234 COURSE CONTENT 
Terminal Learning Objective 1 
Purpose: Explain the elements of contingency contracting planning 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Identify action to be taken during pre-deployment phase 
• Identify types of contingencies 
• Describe the four phases of contingencies 
• Identify the various combat support agencies 
• Compare service theater support organizations and capabilities 
Terminal Learning Objective 2 
Purpose: Recognize the importance of ethical behavior in a contracting environment 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Describe ethical behaviors in a foreign contracting environment 
• Identify ethical resources in a contingency environment 
Terminal Learning Objective 3 
Purpose: Explain your role and responsibilities in a contingency contracting environment 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Define contingency contracting 
• Describe the contracting support structure 
• Compare various contracting structures 
Terminal Learning Objective 4 
Purpose: Explain the impact of cross-cultural behavior patterns, anti-terrorism 
vulnerabilities and operational security in a contingency contracting environment 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Differentiate between foreign acquisition solutions 
• Identify actions to ensure operational security (OPSEC) during a contingency 
• Describe various anti-terrorism measures in a contingency environment 
Terminal Learning Objective 5 
Purpose: Verify that a purchase request (PR) document is properly documented and 
certified 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
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• Identify types of contingency funding 
• Discriminate between various lines of accounting 
• Explain the contract board review process 
• Explain the contract ratification process 
Terminal Learning Objective 6 
Purpose: Complete the appropriate contract actions based on a given scenario in a 
contingency contracting operation 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Differentiate between declared and non-declared contingency contracting 
thresholds 
• Identify contracting dollar thresholds 
• Distinguish between contract types 
• Identify contractual instruments and appointed personnel in a contingency 
contracting environment 
• Identify elements in a procurement instrument identification number (PIIN) log 
Terminal Learning Objective 7 
Purpose: Outline a course of action for a disaster or emergency response scenario 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Describe the relationship among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the DoD 
• Identify actions taken during the advance planning phase of disaster response 
• Recognize potential pitfalls when conducting disaster response contracting 
operations 
Terminal Learning Objective 8 
Purpose: Perform common contract administration actions required in a contingency 
contracting operation 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Identify documents required in a contract file 
• Identify post-award actions to be taken by contracting officer 
• Summarize COR duties 
• Identify items required in a COR’s file 
• Compare contract termination options 
• Identify contract closeout procedures in a contingency environment 
Terminal Learning Objective 9 
Purpose: Discuss actions a contracting officer should take when completing a contract 
claim, protest and/or dispute 
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Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Identify actions to take when notified of a potential claim or protest 
• Identify actions to reduce the probability of claims or protests (DAU, 2010b, para. 
1-9) 
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APPENDIX B—CON 334 COURSE CONTENT 
Terminal Learning Objective 1 
Purpose: Recognize and defend the most appropriate approaches for a contingency Chief 
of Contracting Office (CoCo) throughout the four phases of a contingency 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Chose the most appropriate resource(s) during all phases of a contingency 
contracting operation 
• Create a brief for the operational commander showing comprehension of the 
contingency contracting sustainment environment 
Terminal Learning Objective 2 
Purpose: Recommend contract support for the warfighter in any given situation 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Create a brief overview of the joint operations planning process with focus on 
CSIP Annex W of OPORD/OPLAN 
• Identify the challenges of CSIP development efforts 
• Examine the options for support available for oversight of contract actions 
• Analyze the contingency contracting issues not covered 
• Propose solutions to contingency challenges identified by various Congressional 
studies 
Terminal Learning Objective 3 
Purpose: Justify an appropriate ethical approach in a contingency contracting 
environment 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Determine ethical contingency contracting attributes for a lead CCO 
• Defend the most effective ethical approach given a contingency contracting 
scenario 
Terminal Learning Objective 4 
Purpose: Choose the most appropriate resource for a contingency contracting operation 
during its planning phases 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Evaluate the requirements needed to prepare contingency contracting support plan 
• Prepare a brief for the COCOM and discuss how contingency contracting can be a 
force multiplier 
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Terminal Learning Objective 5 
Purpose: Determine the appropriate contractual resolution for a contingency 
requirement 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Explain the role of the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) 
• Summarize the flow of the JARB process 
• Analyze requirement packages to the JARB 
• Validate requirements packages throughout the JARB process 
Terminal Learning Objective 6 
Purpose: Apply the necessary steps in the source selection process given a situation 
requiring the need to select a “Best Value” offer in response to a government 
requirement 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Define the term source selection 
• Explain the elements of the formal source selection process 
• Create instructions to offerors and evaluation factors for a best value source 
selection 
Terminal Learning Objective 7 
Purpose: Choose the most appropriate resource during the redeployment phase of a 
contingency operation 
Enabling Learning Objectives: 
• Examine different redeployment possibilities 
• Determine which processes are the most appropriate for a given redeployment 
scenario 
• Defend a redeployment approach (DAU, 2010d, para. 1-7) 
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APPENDIX C—MN 3318 COURSE CONTENT 
Topic 1—Types of Contingencies 
Purpose: Identify the contracting laws, regulations, and procedures unique to various 
types of contingency operations 
Supporting Topics: 
• Define and explain contingency contracting 
• Identify contingency contracting sources of guidance 
• Compare and contrast various types of contingencies 
• Explain the four phases of typical support 
• Discuss waivers and deviations for contingency operations 
• Discuss expedited contracting procedures 
Topic 2—Cross-Cultural Awareness 
Purpose: Recognize cross-cultural behavior patterns and anti-terrorism vulnerabilities 
and explain their impact on contingency contracting 
Supporting Topics: 
• Introduce students to cross-cultural concepts 
• Understand how enculturation may lead to obstacles in communication 
• Identify cross-cultural behaviors and discuss adaptation and assimilation 
• Compare and contrast U.S. values with other world views 
• Discuss awareness to culture as it affects behaviors, perspectives, and the ability 
to function and conduct business in a dissimilar culture 
Topic 3—Roles and Responsibilities 
Purpose: Identify key personnel and organizations in a contingency, their roles and 
responsibilities, and required coordination 
Supporting Topics: 
• Describe the mission and capabilities of the DoD’s contracting organizations that 
support contingency operations 
• Describe the roles and missions of non-DoD and NGOs in contingency operations 
• Describe and discuss joint contingency contracting to include: command structure 
from the national level to the joint task force (JTF), differences between 
operational and contracting authority, and key players in a JTF and the CCO's 
relationship with them 
• State the most significant differences between U.S. and multinational contingency 
contracting operations 
• Explain the responsibilities of a CCO in a JTF 
• Compare and contrast the roles, responsibilities, and contractual authority 
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(including training requirements) of OOs, CORs, government purchase card 
(GPC) holders, and disbursing agents 
• Identify potential customers and other key personnel and agencies in the 
contracting officer's area of responsibility 
• Discuss the roles of the CCO, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), AMC, 
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA), Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA), and supported operational commanders by using 
CAP programs (e.g., LOGCAP) to support a contingency 
• Describe an effective program to train customers, OOs, CORs, quality assurance 
evaluators (QAEs), GPC holders, and disbursing agents for their respective roles 
in contingency contracting operations 
• Develop a process for customers to submit procurement requests to the CCO 
Topic 4—Automated Tools 
Purpose: Assess customer requirements and select, justify, and execute the appropriate 
procurement action 
Supporting Topics: 
• Apply automated procedures to assemble, prepare, and closeout documents, files, 
and reports 
• Identify and demonstrate familiarity with the automated resources required for 
optimization of the contingency contracting office 
• Conduct automated tool familiarization 
• Identify, select, and complete specific contract vehicles based on case scenarios 
Topic 5—Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning 
Purpose: Identify, summarize, and discuss the key elements of deliberate and crisis action 
planning as they relate to contingency contracting planning 
Supporting Topics: 
• Describe the major elements of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES) and discuss the importance of joint planning to the contracting 
function 
• Describe the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) and discuss how a 
CCO would use it 
• Describe and discuss the contents of a CSIP 
• Discuss CCO pre-deployment actions 
Topic 6—Anti-Terrorism and Security 




• Identify and discuss effective anti-terrorism practices necessary for personal 
security, travel, vehicle security, and operational, information, personnel, and 
physical security 
Topic 7—Funding of Contingency Operations 
Purpose: Identify and apply the contracting laws, regulations, and procedures for funding 
and operations unique to various types of contingency operations 
Supporting Topics: 
• Demonstrate familiarity with various types of funds used in contingency 
operations 
• Describe the various fiscal controls on appropriate funds 
• State the approval level required for the amount and the type of funds being used 
for specific contracting actions 
• Explain the circumstances in which CAP may be authorized 
• Describe the proper use of operations and maintenance funds for deployment and 
contingency operations 
• Explain the difference between Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations 
and their proper use 
• Describe the proper use of funds from other congressional appropriations 
• Discuss the proper use of funds received from other countries and alliances 
Topic 8—Administration, Termination and Closeout of Contingency Contracts 
Purpose: Apply automated and manual procedures to assemble, prepare, and close out 
contract documents, files, and reports 
Supporting Topics: 
• Identify the duties and responsibilities of personnel involved in contingency 
contract administration and describe the training each requires to adequately 
perform contract administration functions 
• Compare and contrast the types of contract modifications which are used in 
contingency contracting and their effect on timely performance 
• Explain the procedures for ratifying unauthorized commitments (UC) and 
definitizing un-priced actions 
• Explain the procedures used to transfer open contracts and orders to other 
contracting offices and agencies 
• Discuss the judgmental, ethical, and environmental factors considered when 
terminating and closing out contracts 
• Discuss the typical reasons for contractor submission of claims and list the 
documentation required for negotiation and settlement of modifications, claims, 
and disputes 
• Describe the record-keeping required in administering and closing out 
contingency contracts and discuss procedures for monitoring the performance of 
contracting personnel 
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• Demonstrate proper conduct of administration and termination actions 
Topic 9—Case Studies and Integrating Concepts 
Purpose: Prepare and brief the class on various case scenarios designed to enhance and 
capitalize on the major lessons 
Supporting Topics: 
• Select one of the cases that was utilized during the course 
• Analyze the LOGCAP case that takes place in the Balkans and was co-developed 
by the NPS, George Washington University, and contractors 
Topic 10—Ethical Business Conduct 
Purpose: Exercise and apply ethical principles in performing the duties of a contingency 
contracting officer 
Supporting Topics: 
• Assess ethical dilemmas facing the CCO 
• Determine the best approach and course of action when dealing with challenging 
scenarios 
• Make sound recommendations and choices based on operational, ethical, and 
theater objectives (Yoder, 2010, p. 1-8) 
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APPENDIX D—MN 3318 COURSE SYLLABUS 
Session 0—Pre-class Commencement Readings 
Purpose: Familiarize students with current contingency contracting operations prior to 
Day 1 of class in order to provide a course orientation 
Reading assignments: 
• Creating something from nothing 
• The Yoder Three-tier Model, 2004 NPS Working Paper Series 
• Orchestrating, synchronizing, and integrating program management of 
contingency acquisition planning and its operational execution, DoD Directive 
3020.49 
• Joint Publication 4-10 Operational contract support 
Session 1—Course Introduction, Types of Contingencies, Ethics and Integrity 
Purpose: Familiarize students with types of contingency operations and introduce 
concepts related to ethics, fraud indicators, standards of conduct, and procurement 
integrity in the expeditionary environment 
Reading assignments: 
• Battlefield business deals are cut in Afghanistan 
• Blood money (Chapters 1-5) 
• Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook (Chapters 1 and 2) 
• Army husband and wife sentenced to jail term 
Session 2—Authorities and Structure 
Purpose: Familiarize students with the authorities and structure, in addition to the 
contingency funding and requirements process 
Reading assignments: 
• Contingency contracting in the Pacific Command 
• Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook (Chapters 3, 4 and 8) 
• Blood money (Chapters 1-5) 
Session 3—Planning and Guidance 
Purpose: Familiarize students with contingency contract planning and guidance for 
Phase “0” Operations with discussion of planning resources required to orchestrate and 
synchronize contract support 
Reading assignments: 
• Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook (Chapter 7) 
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• Joint effects-based contracting execution system 
• JCS joint planning overview, combined reading and slides 
• Joint Publication 4-10 Operational contract support 
• Joint Publication 5-0 Joint operation planning 
• Planning: The key to contractors success on the battlefield 
Session 4—Contracting Processes and Contract Administration 
Purpose: Familiarize students with contracting processes and contract administration in 
the expeditionary environment 
Reading assignments: 
• Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook (Chapters 5, 6 and 10) 
• SF-44 Automated fact sheet 
• SPS-DP2: Contingency suite fact sheet 
Session 5—Cross Cultural Awareness and Anti-Terrorism Awareness and Security 
Purpose: Familiarize students with cross cultural awareness topics and discuss force 
protection principles and anti-terrorism awareness 
Reading assignments: 
• Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook (Chapters 3, 6 and 8) 
• CJCS Anti-terrorism level I brief 
• Blood money (Chapters 6-9) 
• JCS Long war 
• Al Qaeda’s New front, PBS Frontline 
Session 6—Humanitarian and/or Combat Operations Support 
Purpose: Familiarize students with a CCO’s responsibilities in various scenarios 
including a humanitarian environment and during combat operations 
Reading assignments: 
• Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook (Chapter 9) 
• Blood money (Chapters 10-14) 
• Humanitarian operations slides 
• FEMA National response framework, handbook 
• Civil-military coordination in disaster response, presentation 
• Time to clarify military roles in disaster relief 
• Federal troops for disaster response: Legal issues and the Stafford Act, CRS 
report 
• The storm, PBS Frontline 
• Take home exam 
•  
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Session 7—Contractors Accompanying the Force 
Purpose: Familiarize students with the benefits and challenges as well as the regulations 
governing contractors accompanying the force 
Reading assignments: 
• Contractors on the battlefield 
• Civilians on the battlefield, Military Review 2004 
• Contractors Accompanying the force 
• How should the Army use contractors? 
• Who's getting away with murder? 
• DoD Instruction 3020.41, dated Oct 2005 
• Blood money (Chapters 10-14) 
• Private warriors, PBS Frontline 
Session 8—Guest Speaker 
Purpose: Familiarize students with recent and relevant contingency contracting lessons 
learned 
Reading assignments: 
• Blood money (Chapters 10-14) 
Session 9—Security, Stabilization, and Rebuilding 
Purpose: Familiarize students with the role contracting has played in the security, 
stabilization, and rebuilding in Iraq 
Reading assignments: 
• Comprehensive Oversight Plan, Afghanistan 2009-2010 
• Comprehensive Oversight Plan, Southwest Asia (Iraq) 2009-2010 
• Operation Iraqi Freedom: Drawdown plan, GAO report 
• Report for Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
• No end in site, PBS Frontline 
Session 10—Team Presentations 
Purpose: Students are broken into teams and then assigned readings with the task of 
preparing a presentation on a particular topic which captures the assigned readings, 
previous class materials and any previous CCO experience 
Reading assignments: 





Session 11—Final Exam 
Purpose: Students are evaluated on their comprehension of the previous ten sessions, 
discussions and assigned readings 
There are no reading assignments (Yoder, 2010, p. 1-8) 
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APPENDIX E—SMCT (51C) CONTENT 
Task 1-1—Identify Supported Units 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can identify supported unit(s) and obtain contracting related 
information about their structure, equipment, mission, key personnel, and processes 
necessary for effective contracting support 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive tasking to provide contracting support 
• Identify critical unit attributes 
• Identify supported units battle rhythm and processes 
• Identify key contracting related processes and procedures 
Task 1-2—Train Supported Units (Operational Contract Support) 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can plan, prepare, execute, and assess contingency 
contracting training for an assigned unit in all phases of the ARFORGEN (Army force 
generation) cycle 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Train CORs, field ordering officers (FOO), and leaders to conduct contract-
related processes in accordance with applicable regulations and procedures in 
garrison and field environments. 
• Ensure the unit can leverage economic lines of operation (ELOO). 
• Assist in the development and implementation of the unit’s tactical standing 
operating procedures (TACSOP) 
Task 1-3—Advise Supported Units 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can provide advice to the supported unit by applying 
principles of best business practices, FAR 7, and the military decision-making process 
(MDMP) 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Identify situations requiring advisement to supported units 
• Advise supported units 
Task 1-4—Review Contracting Support Integration Plans 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can conduct mission analysis, identify key tasks related to 
contingency contracting support, and prepare a comprehensive CSIP in accordance with 
Joint Publication 4-10 
Supporting Tasks: 
 138
• Receive and analyze the mission 
• Prepare a CSIP 
Task 2-1—Procurement Desktop Defense 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can operate the functions within a Procurement Desktop 
Defense (PD2) system and administer contracting actions within the PD2 framework 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Administer a solicitation (“T” Contract) 
• Administer a purchase order (“P” Contract) 
• Administer a General Services Administration (GSA) order (“F” Contract) 
• Administer an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) order (“D” Contract) 
• Administer a blanket purchase agreement (BPA) call order (“A” Contract) 
• Administer a modification order in PD2 
• Administer closeout procedures in PD2 
Task 2-2—Review Purchase Requests and Supporting Documents 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can review a procurement package for completeness, 
accuracy, and compliance with appropriate regulations, laws, and applicable 
international agreements and local policies 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Review PRs and accurately indentify erroneous or missing information 
• Review supporting documentation, accurately identifying erroneous or missing 
information 
• Review service contract supporting documentation, accurately identifying 
erroneous or missing information 
• Review construction contract supporting documentation, accurately identifying 
erroneous or missing information 
Task 2-3—Conduct Market Research 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can determine the most suitable approach to acquiring, 
distributing, and supporting supplies and services by collectively gathering and 
documenting available market information from relevant sources inside and outside the 
contracting activity 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Contact knowledgeable individuals in government and industry to determine 
capabilities 
• Review market research to support requirements 
• Publish formal requests for information in appropriate technical or scientific 
journals or business publications 
• Analyze and document results of market research appropriately 
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Task 2-4—Conduct Acquisition Planning 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can analyze a supported organization’s requirement and 
develop the most efficient and effective strategy for meeting its needs 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Analyze the requirement 
• Determine the level of commerciality 
• Determine an optimal source of supply 
• Determine the socioeconomic requirements 
• Determine the level of competition 
• Determine the evaluation procedures 
• Determine the contract type procedures 
• Determine the publicizing actions 
• Determine the solicitation method 
• Identify additional planning requirements 
• Document the plan in accordance with local procedures 
Task 2-5—Document Other Than Full and Open Competition 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can identify the correct authority authorizing the 
contracting action, the correct format for the justification, the necessary publicizing and 
announcements, and the appropriate approvals required based on the requirement and 
applicable thresholds 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive a purchase request requiring the restriction or the limiting of competition 
• Identify the correct procedure(s) for authorizing the restriction or the limiting of 
competition 
• Prepare a justification in accordance with the appropriate format 
• Obtain required approvals 
• Announce the requirement as required 
Task 2-6—Synopsize Proposed Contract Actions 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can prepare a complete and accurate synopsis in 
compliance with appropriate regulations, laws, and local policies that clearly 
communicate the government’s intent to solicit supply items, services, or construction 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Determine if a solicitation must be synopsized 
• Prepare the synopsis 
• Post the synopsis to the government point of entry (GPE) 
• Cancel the synopsis 
Task 2-7—Solicit Competition 
 140
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can prepare a solicitation including the required clauses 
and provisions, which are in compliance with appropriate regulations, laws, and 
applicable local policies 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Conduct an oral solicitation correctly and document it appropriately 
• Conduct a request for quotation (RFQ), correctly including applicable clauses and 
provisions 
• Conduct a request for proposal (RFP), correctly including applicable clauses and 
provisions 
• Conduct a RFP for construction, correctly including applicable clauses and 
provisions 
• Conduct a combined synopsis/solicitation, correctly including applicable clauses 
and provisions 
Task 2-8—Receive Solicitation Responses 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can receive solicitation responses and secure them in 
accordance with the FAR, DFARS and the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(AFARS) 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Properly receive and mark solicitation responses 
• Initiate steps to safeguard solicitation responses from unauthorized disclosure 
Task 2-9—Evaluate Offers 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can evaluate offers consistent with the specifications in the 
solicitation and determine the offer that is the best value 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Eliminate unresponsive offers and sufficiently document the rationale for the 
contract file 
• Utilize the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) in accordance with FAR 9.405 to 
ensure there are no offerors from a vendor debarred, suspended, or proposed for 
debarment to be evaluated for award 
• Verify prospective contractors are registered in the Contractor Central 
Registration (CCR) system in accordance with FAR 4.1103 
• Apply the evaluation criteria and process appropriately and consistently as 
defined in the solicitation in accordance with FAR 13.106-2 
• Review price and past performance of offerors to determine the best value in 
accordance with FAR 13.106-2(b)(4)(ii) 
• Form, conduct, and close a technical evaluation board (TEB) 
• Determine the LPTA offer in accordance with FAR 13.106-2(b)(4)(i) and 
consistent with the specification of the award solicitation 
• Determine a fair and reasonable price using FAR 13 
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• Make a contractor’s responsibility determination prior to award in accordance 
with FAR 9.103 and document the file 
• Properly document the contract file with the evaluation results and fair and 
reasonable price determination in accordance with the FAR and applicable local 
procedures 
Task 2-10—Prepare Contract Awards 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can correctly prepare contract award in support of contract 
operations 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Properly receive and review offers/quotes to ensure completeness and ensure 
sufficient certified funds are available 
• Determine the appropriate type of award instrument 
• Incorporate the proper clauses from the solicitation 
• Incorporate appropriate terms and conditions from the solicitation 
• Determine and document the use of un-priced purchase orders 
• Properly document the award for the contract file 
Task 2-11—Special Funds Codes 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO understands how to explain the difference between when to 
use appropriated operation and maintenance funds 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Identify the purpose of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
program 
• Identify key threshold levels in the CERP program 
• Identify authorized and non-authorized uses of CERP funds 
• Identify the FAR waiver on CERP requirements 
• Identify overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid (OHDACA) 
• Identify the process to secure funding for OHDACA programs 
• Identify the legal constraints on the DoD under OHDACA programs 
• Identify OHDACA contract dollar thresholds 
• Identify the purpose of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
• Identify the process to secure funding for a DSCA-funded item 
• Identify restrictions when dealing with DSCA 
• Identify the DSCA contract dollar threshold 
• Identify Other Procurement, Army (OPA) 
• Identify how OPA is used in the procurement of base-level commercial 
equipment (BCE) items 
• Identify expenditures which cannot be funded by OPA 
Task 2-12—Unspecified Minor Military Construction 
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Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can conduct mission analysis and properly identify and 
explain all key tasks related to unspecified minor military construction (UMMC) projects 
in accordance with the SMCT 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Define UMMC projects 
• Identify funding limits for UMMC projects  
• Identify how to finance UMMC projects using Operation and Maintenance, Army 
(OMA) funds 
• Identify legitimate UMMC project expenditures 
• Identify funding pitfalls of UMMC projects 
Task 2-13—Train, Appoint, and Manage CORs 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can train a COR prior to a contract award to perform his or 
her assigned responsibilities 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Train and appoint CORs 
• Verify COR qualifications 
• Ensure COR personnel files are completed 
Task 3-1—Conduct Post-award Orientations 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can provide the contractor an accurate review of the 
contract milestones within 10 days after award, but before performance is initiated 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Identify the key players and the significant responsibilities of all parties 
• Identify and resolve issues that may affect contract performance 
• Determine the appropriate type of post-award orientation 
• Prepare a post-award letter with minimum requirements 
• Properly conduct a post-award conference 
• Prepare a summary report of post-award conference 
• Provide a timely post-award orientation 
Task 3-2—Notify Unsuccessful Offerors Award Synopsis 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can provide required notifications and debriefings in 
accordance with FAR 5 and 15 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive a contract file 
• Determine post-award notice requirements 
• Notify unsuccessful offerors in accordance with FAR 15.503(b) 
 143
• Determine if an award requires a synopsis in accordance with FAR 5.301 and 
DFARS 205.301 
• Transmit a notification through a GPE in accordance with FAR 5.207,if no 
exemptions apply 
Task 3-3—Issue Delivery Orders/Task Orders/BPA Calls 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can place orders using appropriate procedures against 
existing indefinite delivery contracts (IDC) or place a call against existing BPAs: 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Place an order for supplies or services using a federal supply schedule contract 
• Issue a single or multiple award delivery order (DO) or task order (TO) against a 
federal supply schedule contract 
• Order supplies or services against a BPA 
• Prepare a contract action report (CAR) accurately 
• Properly document a DO, TO, or BPA order 
Task 3-4—Exercise Options 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can correctly identify available options, determine whether 
to exercise the option, and appropriately document the file in accordance with FAR 
17.207 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Identify options available for exercise 
• Evaluate options 
• Determine whether to exercise options in accordance with FAR 17.207(d) 
• Notify the contractor within time limits specified in contract clauses 
• Exercise options and correctly document actions 
Task 3-5—Monitor Contractor Performance 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can monitor contract performance and initiate appropriate 
contractual actions 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Review award contracts 
• Determine monitoring requirements 
• Review evidence of performance and nonperformance 
• Initiate appropriate contract actions 
• Document contractor performance 
Task 3-6—Process Documentation for Payments 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can maintain contract consistency and completeness of the 
invoice and receiving report 
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Supporting Tasks: 
• Determine whether to authorize payment against an invoice in full, in part, or 
deny payment in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract 
• Review contract file for terms and conditions 
• Review invoices from the contractor 
• Review receiving reports 
• Resolve any discrepancies 
• Process documents for payment 
Task 3-7—Modify Contracts 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can review contract awards and determine when 
modifications are required 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Determine if a modification is within the scope of the original contract in 
accordance with FAR 43, FAR 12, and FAR 52.212-4(c) 
• Determine the type of contract modification required in accordance with FAR 
43.103(a) and FAR 43.103(b) or FAR 52.212-4 
• Receive and evaluate evidence requiring a contract modification 
• Determine if a modification is within the scope of the contract 
• Determine unilateral or bilateral contract modifications 
• Process contract modifications 
Task 3-8—Terminate Contracts 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can terminate commercial items, non-commercial items, and 
simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) contracts using applicable FAR regulations 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Identify evidence to terminate a contract for commercial items 
• Assess termination options in accordance with FAR 12, 13, and 49 
• Determine termination methods 
• Terminate for convenience commercial items, non-commercial items, and SAP 
contracts 
• Terminate for cause commercial items, non-commercial items, and SAP contracts 
• Notify the Director of Defense Procurement, as appropriate 
Task 3-9—Conduct Contract Close-Out 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can determine whether a contract is physically complete 
and that all outstanding contract administration issues have been resolved 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Verify contract content 
• Determine that a contract is physically complete 
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• Determine if there are any administrative or financial issues to be closed out 
• Close a contract and prepare a completion statement 
• Store, handle, and dispose of contract documentation appropriately 
Task 3-10—Process Protests 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can process protests in accordance with FAR 33, AFARS 
5133.1, and agency requirements 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive a notice of protest 
• Identify types of protests 
• Issue a denial of protest to the protester(s) 
• Sustain a protest and take appropriate actions in accordance with decision 
• Prepare a protest package in accordance with  GAO protest procedures 
Task 3-11—Process Claims 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can determine if a request for claim meets contract and 
regulatory requirements 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive a claim from the contractor 
• Determine the need for certification of claim by the contractor 
• Process a claim and issue an appropriate final decision 
• Prepare a contracting officer’s final determination memo in accordance with the 
FAR 
Task 3-12—Process Unauthorized Commitments 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can review UC evidence, find it adequate and determine if 
the agreement or purchase in question requires ratification or if the party entering into 
the agreement remains liable 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive evidence for and evaluate a UC 
• Determine if a ratification is appropriate 
• Process a UC 
Task 4-1—Use Standard Form (SF) 44 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can purchased supplies and services at a fair and 
reasonable price, using the SF 44 as a small purchase/contractual instrument 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Explain how to safeguard the SF 44 
• Ensure the SF 44 is authorized for use 
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• Properly prepare a SF 44 
• Correctly distribute copies of the SF 44 
Task 4-2—Train, Appoint, and Manage FOOs 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can train, appoint, and manage an FOO to make over-the-
counter purchases in amounts up to the micro-purchase threshold 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Receive and review a FOO nomination letter from a unit commander 
• Conduct FOO training 
• Appoint a FOO 
• Manage a FOO file 
Task 4-3—Conduct Vendor Education 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can conduct vendor education and provide contractors with 
essential information on how to conduct business with the U.S. government consistent 
with and in support of the ELOO 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Ensure vendor education plan supports local plans to leverage the ELOO 
• Properly analyze local contracting procedures for the deployed area 
• Select the appropriate topics to educate vendors 
• Properly coordinate the location for a vendor education forum 
• Properly coordinate interpreter support 
• Conduct vendor education 
• Monitor results of vendor training 
Tasks 4-4—Employ a GPC as a Payment Method and Procurement Tool 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can determine the proper use of the GPC as procurement 
tool and payment card 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Identify a unit’s GPC program dollar threshold levels 
• Demonstrate an understanding that the unit GPC cardholder needs to seek pre-
purchase approval from a billing official (BO) 
• Demonstrate an understanding that the cardholder conducts market research 
• Demonstrate an understanding of procedures to purchase items or services 
• Demonstrate an understanding that the cardholder needs to document transaction 
• Demonstrate an understanding that the cardholder needs to reconcile monthly 
statements 
• Demonstrate an understanding that the cardholder prepares documentation for 
payment 
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• Demonstrate an understanding that the cardholder & BO reconcile monthly 
statement for payment process 
Task 4-5—Manage Bulk Funds 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can manage bulk funds in compliance with appropriate 
regulations, laws, and policies 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Review and verify that a bulk-funded document is complete and appropriate for 
the contract, BPA, or other specified use 
• Properly and accurately reconcile a bulk fund spreadsheet 
• Properly distribute a bulk-funded contract actions 
• Notify the finance and accounting office at the close of each month 
Task 4-6—Prepare for Deployment 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can conduct mission analysis, identify requirements for 
deployment, and effectively prepare for deployment 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Conduct mission analysis 
• Identify requirements for deployment 
• Determine support and equipment requirements 
• Prepare for deployment 
Task 4-7—Maintain a PIIN Log 
Purpose: Ensure that a CCO can properly maintain a PIIN log 
Supporting Tasks: 
• Create a proper PIIN Log 
• Properly review PIIN Log and resolve any discrepancies 
• Properly monitor and employ the PIIN Log as a contract management tool (ECC, 
2009, pp. 3-51) 
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